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KEDAR S. BHATIA

27 EMORY INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 2013)

DRAFT—OCTOBER 22, 2012

RECONSIDERING THE PURELY JURISDICTIONAL VIEW OF
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
This old but little used section is a kind of legal Lohengrin; although
it has been with us since the first Judiciary Act . . . no one seems to
1
know whence it came.

ABSTRACT
The Alien Tort Statute was enacted by the United States Congress in 1789
and laid dormant for nearly two centuries. After being reanimated in 1980, the
statute now allows United States federal courts to hear claims for violations of
the law of nations stemming from a wide array of behavior. Such an
extraordinary interpretation was far from inevitable, however, and remains on
unsteady footing. This Comment argues that the statute should be regarded as
purely jurisdictional, rather than as a hybrid provision both granting
jurisdiction and authorizing a cause of action. The hybrid model requires
judges to balance the specificity and clarity of international law against the
practical consequences of recognizing a new cause of action, while the
jurisdictional view tasks Congress with making those difficult, complex, and
weighty policy decisions. A strictly jurisdictional view of the Alien Tort Statute
not only provides a manageable framework for expanding the scope of the
statute, but also adheres more closely to well-established views of federal
common law. Recent litigation in the Supreme Court and in lower federal
courts confirms the need for a new reading of this far-reaching statute.

1

IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J.) (citation omitted).
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INTRODUCTION
The Alien Tort Statute2 is a remarkable provision. This thirty-three word
statute, lost for nearly two centuries in the Judiciary Act of 17893 and then in
Title 28 of the U.S. Code,4 now allows United States federal courts to hear
claims stemming from a range of torture,5 corporate malfeasance,6 and human
rights abuses7 anywhere in the world.8 Modern interpretation of the statute
gives it an expansive reach; the statute opens domestic courts to plaintiffs
alleging violation of a potentially unlimited number of customs that comprise
the law of nations.9 Due to its breadth, the statute has been touted as a powerful
tool for advancing human rights interests around the world.10 The statute has
also been set on autopilot, meaning it will incorporate new human rights
abuses as they become part of the law of nations.11 The law of nations has been
notoriously difficult to define, however, leaving courts to lean on a wide range

2

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”). This
Comment uses the term “Alien Tort Statute” rather than “Alien Tort Claims Act” to maintain consistency with
Supreme Court usage, see, for example, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2282 (2010); Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 446, 472 (2004), and because the phrase plainly refers to a portion of the United States Code rather than
an act of Congress entitled “Alien Tort Claims Act.”
3 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
4 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
5 E.g., Kadic v. Karadz̆ ić, 70 F.3d 232, 236–37 (2d Cir. 1995).
6 E.g., Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009).
7 E.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 846, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (affirming a finding of liability for
“torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment” under 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
8 E.g., Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1266; Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 845–46; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 36–37, 242; see
also Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1026 (2011)
(“[T]he relevant context is that the statute authorizes application not of uniquely national law but of
international law, which applies everywhere and authorizes extraterritorial jurisdiction.”). Following the
Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2013), where
the Court applied the principle of extraterritoriality, significant questions remain about the international scope
of the Alien Tort Statute. See infra Part I.G.
9 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) (“[C]ourts should require any claim based on the
present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world . . . .”).
10 See Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing Effects of Tort: How Corporate Complicity Liability Under the
Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 225 (2008) (“[W]here the
political branches have made the broad determination that constructive engagement is the most effective policy
for encouraging democratic reform and respect for human rights in a particular nation, [Alien Tort Statute]
complicity liability serves a vital role; it ensures that individual corporations are held accountable on a caseby-case basis if they subvert that policy by aiding and abetting rights abuses.”); see also
Jordan J. Paust, Litigating Human Rights: A Commentary on the Comments, 4 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 81, 83 (1981).
11 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714, 732–33. But see infra text accompanying notes 218–227 (noting that the Alien
Tort Statute provides a cause of action for only a subset of the full “law of nations” used in most contexts).
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of definitions when resolving what behavior falls within the contours of the
statute.12
But such an extraordinary interpretation was far from inevitable13 and
remains on unsteady footing.14 On its face, the statute merely provides federal
courts with “original jurisdiction . . . for a tort . . . committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”15 Recent litigation in the
Supreme Court of the United States has reinforced the need to retool this
internally inconsistent and ultimately unsatisfying framework.16 In Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., a case recently decided by the Supreme Court,
briefing by the parties and amici made it more clear than ever that there is
crippling confusion over both the theoretical foundation of the statute and its
practical application. The parties in Kiobel struggled not only with
maneuvering within the existing framework for litigating Alien Tort Statute
claims, but also with much of the ground-level analysis of customary
international law that courts must routinely perform.17

12 The Supreme Court has defined the law of nations as “norm[s] of international character accepted by
the civilized world . . . .” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. That Court and others have reached back to a seminal case in
international law, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), for guidance. E.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734; TelOren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring); Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880–81 (2d Cir. 1980). Other courts, however, have used either a subset of the
sources suggested by The Paquete Habana or have branched off into entirely different sources. See Howard S.
Schrader, Note, Custom and General Principles as Sources of International Law in American Federal Courts,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 751, 763–65 (1982) (noting that courts in the United States are increasing their reliance on
nonbinding treaties and resolutions to define customary international law).
13 A symposium on the role of international law in federal courts held by the Virginia Journal of
International Law in 2001 serves as a tremendous source of information on the Alien Tort Statute, and the
symposium is especially useful because the views expressed therein were unencumbered by the Supreme
Court’s views on the matter that would come later in Sosa. See Symposium, Foreign Courts and Foreign
Affairs, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365 (2002).
14 A symposium held by this Journal in 2004 provided a series of invaluable first-impressions of Sosa.
See Symposium, Alien Tort Claims After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 69 (2005).
15 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (emphasis added).
16 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2013).
17 See Brief for Petitioners at 43–47, Kiobel, No. 10-1491 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2011); Brief for Respondent at
27–43, Kiobel, No. 10-1491 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2012). The terms “customary international law” and “law of
nations” are not interchangeable. See Harold J. Berman, The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Law of Nations, 19
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 69, 70–71 (2005) (discussing the many differences between the law of nations and
customary international law); Joseph Sorrentino, Recent Decision, Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343
F.3d. 140 (2d Cir. 2003), N.Y. INT’L L. REV., Winter 2004, at 133, 133 n.8 (citing Michael J. Glennon, Can the
President Do No Wrong?, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 923, 924–25 (1986); Michael T. Morely, Note, The Law of
Nations and the Offenses Clause of the Constitution: A Defense of Federalism, 112 YALE L.J. 109, 142–43
(2002)) (noting the differences between the law of nations and customary international law). However, the
Supreme Court and other federal courts, as well as many scholars, have used the terms synonymously. See,
e.g., Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chemical Co., 517 F.3d 104, 116 (2d Cir. 2008) (“In
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This Comment argues that the statute should be regarded as a purely
jurisdictional provision, rather than as a hybrid clause granting jurisdiction and
authorizing a cause of action. Instead of requiring courts to measure the
specificity of international law and gauge the practical consequences of
recognizing a new cause of action, the jurisdictional view would require
Congress to make those difficult, complex, and weighty policy decisions. A
purely jurisdictional view of the statute adheres more closely to wellestablished views of federal common law and also patches up many of the
problems that have arisen in applying the statute. A strictly jurisdictional view
of the Alien Tort Statute would also provide a manageable framework for
expanding the scope of the statute as new international norms mature.
Part I.A of this Comment provides background information about the
competing views of the Alien Tort Statute’s origins. Part I.B describes
litigation centered on the Alien Tort Statute during the late-seventeenth and
early-eighteenth centuries. Parts I.C, I.D, and I.E summarize vitally important
cases in the development of Alien Tort Statute jurisprudence, with a particular
focus on how those cases treated the jurisdictional view and affected its longterm development. Part I.F discusses the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and shows how the decision may have been more
unsettling than the Court intended. Part II begins by addressing key
assumptions of the Sosa framework and then shows that Sosa failed to properly
place the Alien Tort Statute within existing legal frameworks or to explain how
it departed from those schemes. Finally, Part III explains how courts can more
cleanly resolve contemporary issues in Alien Tort Statute litigation under the
jurisdictional view than under the present model.
I. HISTORY OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND
THE PURELY JURISDICTIONAL VIEW
The history of the Alien Tort Statute is a complicated one, but it partially
explains the wealth of theoretical problems currently plaguing the statute. First
passed in 1789 as part of the Judiciary Act, the statute was mentioned only
occasionally during the early years of the republic. Looking at those early
the broader context, the law of nations has become synonymous with the term ‘customary international
law’ . . . .”); Kadic v. Karadz̆ ić, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[A]s a definitive statement of norms of
customary international law . . . we ruled that ‘official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations.’”
(citation omitted) (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980)). But see, e.g., Flores v. S.
Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247 (2d Cir. 2003) (“‘[T]he law of nations,’ . . . as used in this statute, refers
to the body of law known as customary international law.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
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cases can be frustrating; most provide only scraps of information about the
original meaning, intent, or purpose of the statute. The statute then went into a
long period of dormancy that ended in the 1960s, when federal appellate courts
began to mention the statute in passing and, in one case, even claimed
jurisdiction under its auspices. This period of revival coincided with a
renaissance in the way the United States viewed its international
responsibilities, its role in the world, and its need to protect human rights
across the globe.
In 1980, the Alien Tort Statute received a galvanizing push from the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the landmark case Filartiga v. PenaIrala.18 In the wake of that decision, scholars and judges leapt to the challenge
of defining the statute and exploring different techniques for applying it to
ever-changing situations. After two decades of debate and discussion, the
Supreme Court finally stepped into the fray in 2004 with its decision in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain. That decision settled the law in some ways, but in other
ways it failed to provide lower courts with the guidance they needed to
evaluate some of the most creative claims brought by plaintiffs. The halfmeasure provided by Sosa has resulted in confusion within the lower federal
courts, forcing many into contorted positions when evaluating new claims
under the statute. When the Court revisited the Alien Tort Statute nearly a
decade after Sosa, it cut back on the practical application of the Alien Tort
Statute but barely addressed doctrinal tension that continues to vex the statute.
A. Enactment and Original Intent
The Alien Tort Statute was passed into law as part of the Judiciary Act of
1789.19 As it was written, the Act afforded district courts “cognizance,
concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the
case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”20 The Alien Tort Statute was
included in Section 9 of the Judiciary Act, a section primarily dealing with
exclusive jurisdiction in federal district courts and admiralty issues.21 In this

18 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). In Filartiga, the Second Circuit held that, among other things, torture
could constitute a violation of the law of nations in certain circumstances and that reading the Alien Tort
Statute to provide jurisdiction for that violation of the law of nations did not breach the contours of Article III.
Id. at 884–87.
19 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77.
20 Id.
21 Id.; see also Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 280 (1999).
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original form the section closely mirrored language in Article I, Section 8 of
the United States Constitution, which authorizes Congress to “define and
punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations.”22
The intent of the First Congress remains unclear despite the attention of
judges and legal scholars.23 There are at least two general theories of the
statute’s origins: the citizenship view and the specific tort view. Advocates of
the first view, the citizenship theory, believe the Alien Tort Statute was
designed to give aliens redress for tort offenses committed by citizens of the
United States against aliens within United States borders.24 Under this theory,
nations have an affirmative duty to hold their citizens accountable for harms
against the citizens of other nations.25 Proponents of the theory note that the
United States had been embarrassed by the inability of its courts to adequately
redress claims brought by two foreign diplomats under the Articles of
Confederation.26 The First Congress, following in the footsteps of the
Continental Congress, took steps to ensure that the federal courts could provide
aliens some form of redress in the United States.27 This theory relies heavily on
the writings of Emmerich de Vattel, particularly his treatise, The Law of
Nations.28 In his treatise, Vattel notes that states may ratify the behavior of
their citizens through ex ante authorization of private action or through ex post
failure to redress the wrongdoing.29 At the time, the ratification of a citizen’s

22

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718–19 (2004) (“[D]espite considerable scholarly
attention, it is fair to say that a consensus understanding of what Congress intended [when it drafted the Alien
Tort Statute] has proved elusive.”); see also, e.g., JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32118, THE
ALIEN TORT STATUTE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH VIEWS 8–11 (2003); Anthony J. Bellia
Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445 (2011);
Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830 (2006).
24 See, e.g., Bellia & Clark, supra note 23, at 519–20 (“Taken in context at the time it was enacted, the
language of the [Alien Tort Statute] did not encompass claims between aliens for acts occurring in other
nations’ territories because such claims did not involve violations of the law of nations by the United States or
its citizens.”); see also id. at 472–73 (“Of particular relevance to the [Alien Tort Statute], a nation had a duty to
prevent its citizens from harming not only ambassadors and public ministers whom it received, but all foreign
citizens it admitted within its borders . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
25 Id. at 471–77.
26 Carlee M. Hobbs, Note, The Conflict Between the Alien Tort Statute Litigation and Foreign Amnesty
Laws, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 505, 508 (2010) (discussing the embarrassment that arose when United
States federal courts were unequipped to deal with a pair of claims regarding foreign diplomats in the 1780s).
27 Bellia & Clark, supra note 23, at 504–05.
28 See, e.g., id. at 471–77.
29 Id. at 474–75 (quoting 1 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE: APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS bk. II, §§ 77–78, at 145–46
(London, J. Newberry 1759) (1758)).
23
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tort action against an alien transferred liability to the host nation and was
grounds for a declaration of war.30 The Alien Tort Statute could be seen as a
direct attempt to ensure that the United States did not offend other nations or,
perhaps more importantly, expose itself to a declaration of war.31
The second theory—and the one to which the Supreme Court would
eventually subscribe—is that the statute was designed to serve as a cause of
action for specific torts.32 Proponents of this theory sometimes start from the
premise that the Alien Tort Statute is purely jurisdictional on its face but then
argue that the statute was surely designed to incorporate some claims at its
inception.33 The Supreme Court has noted that “although the [Alien Tort
Statute] is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action, the
reasonable inference from the historical materials is that the statute was
intended to have practical effect the moment it became law.”34 The Supreme
Court concluded that the statute allowed claims for behavior that Sir William
Blackstone identified as the principal violations of the law of nations: piracy,
violations of safe conduct, and disputes regarding ambassadors.35 Notably,
scholars who subscribe to the specific-tort view of the statute often disagree
about which torts the statute intended to cover.36

30 Id. at 476 (citing 2 VATTEL, supra note 29, bk. III, §§ 24–26, at 10–11 (London, J. Coote 1759)
(1758)).
31 State courts were, and remain today, authorized to hear claims by aliens against citizens of the United
States, but the First Congress may have been worried about the treatment that foreign nationals, especially
British nationals, would receive in state courts. See Anthony D’Amato, Editorial Comment, The Alien Tort
Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 62, 65, 65 n.12 (1988); Lee, supra note 23, at
882.
32 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
33 See, e.g., id.
34 Id.
35 Id.; see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 631–32
(2002); Hobbs, supra note 26, at 508. But see Lee, supra note 23, at 836 (arguing that the authors of the
Judiciary Act meant to include only matters of safe conduct and not claims related to piracy or ambassadors).
For the three primary offenses against the law of nations that Blackstone identified, see 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68.
36 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 23, at 836 (arguing that only violations of safe conduct were originally
covered by the statute); Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 445, 447 (1995) (arguing that only a narrow class of prize claims was
covered). For a general overview of the statute’s origins, see William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the
Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the “Originalists,” 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 225–37
(1996).
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B. Early Use
Uncertainty surrounding the original meaning of the statute is partially
attributable to the dearth of early litigation involving the statute.37 While the
statute was discussed periodically in cases during the late-eighteenth and
twentieth centuries,38 there were only two successful applications of the statute
between 1789 and 1980.39 The Alien Tort Statute was first cited in a federal
opinion in Moxon v. The Fanny,40 which was decided in 1793, just four years
after the statute was enacted as part of the Judiciary Act. In Moxon, the owners
of a British ship that had been seized by a French schooner brought a bill of
libel against the captain of the French vessel.41 The British ship was captured
well within the territorial waters of the United States, but the French captain
challenged the jurisdiction of United States courts to hear the case, arguing that
he was authorized by the French government to capture enemy English ships.42
The district judge eventually dismissed the bill of libel on jurisdictional
grounds, holding that the bill “cannot be called a suit for a tort only, when the
property, as well as damages for the supposed trespass, are sought for.”43
Although the district court declined jurisdiction under the Alien Tort
Statute, the case is notable because it demonstrates the tremendous political
forces at play in Alien Tort Statute cases. When Moxon was decided, the
United States had only recently struck an uneasy peace with Great Britain.44
When France went to war with Great Britain, the United States adopted a

37 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 35, at 588 n.5 (citing thirteen cases from 1793 to 1980 in which a
plaintiff unsuccessfully invoked the Alien Tort Statute as a basis for jurisdiction); Kenneth C. Randall, Federal
Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
1, 4 n.15 (1985) (citing twenty-one published decisions prior to Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980), in which a plaintiff asserted jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute).
38 Supra note 37.
39 The Alien Tort Statute was only upheld as a basis for jurisdiction in two reported cases prior to 1980.
Bradley, supra note 35, at 588; Randall, supra note 37, at 5. The two cases upholding jurisdiction, Adra v.
Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 865 (D. Md. 1961), and Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No.
1607) (“Besides, . . . the 9th section of the judiciary act of congress gives this court concurrent jurisdiction
with the state courts and circuit court of the United States where an alien sues for a tort, in violation of the law
of nations, or a treaty of the United States . . . .”) (citation omitted), were separated by almost a century.
40 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895).
41 Id. at 942–43.
42 Id. at 943.
43 Id. at 948.
44 Office of the Historian, Milestones: 1784-1800—John Jay’s Treaty, U.S. DEP’T STATE, http://history.
state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/JayTreaty (last visited April 1, 2013) (“Tensions between the United States
and Britain remained high after the Revolutionary War . . . .”).
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position of neutrality.45 In Moxon, the federal judge reiterated that the United
States was “at peace with the king and people of Great Britain.”46 The judge
noted that interference with foreign sovereigns and their agents is a power
reserved to other branches of government.47 The court stated that even if the
offense was viewed as a violation of the United States’ neutrality, “still the
question recurs—which is the proper department of the neutral state to inquire
into and vindicate this offence?”48 The court concluded that the judiciary was
not equipped to provide a complete remedy and must defer resolution of the
case to the political branches.49
From 1795 to 1960, the Alien Tort Statute was rarely discussed in any
meaningful way. When it was cited, it was often only in passing amidst
discussions of concurrent federal and state jurisdiction, like in a pair of state
court cases in 1816 and 1819.50 Apart from those fleeting references and a
handful of others,51 the Alien Tort Statute remained dormant through the
nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries.
C. Abrupt Reanimation in the Twentieth Century
As the Alien Tort Statute lay dormant, the United States went through a
series of seismic events that affected the courts and their view of international
law. By the time the Alien Tort Statute reemerged from its dormancy in 1960,
the political and legal landscape in America had transformed into something
entirely foreign to the one in which the statute was enacted. Politically, the
United States had evolved from a young nation, committed to neutrality, to an
active international superpower, eager to assert its influence abroad.52 Global

45 Proclamation of Neutrality (April 22, 1793), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN
RELATIONS 140 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington, D.C., Gales & Seaton 1833),
available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsp&fileName=001/llsp001.db&recNum=4; see
also David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Third Congress, 1793-1795, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4
(1996).
46 Moxon, 17 F. Cas., at 943; accord id. at 942.
47 See id. at 947 (“[The judiciary has] none of the powers of peace or war.”).
48 Id.
49 See id. (“If this court would assume jurisdiction, and could ascertain our territorial limits and restore
the property, the outrage would still remain for the nation to vindicate . . . . Therefore the court could afford
but a partial remedy: and it is best to be settled where the whole can be accomplished.”).
50 United States v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. Cas. 4, 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819); Hartley v. United States, 4 Tenn. (3
Hayw.) 45, 51 (Tenn. 1816).
51 See supra note 37.
52 See Office of the Historian, Milestones: 1945-1952—The Early Cold War, U.S. DEP’T STATE,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952 (last visited April 1, 2013).
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powers mobilized to defend human rights53 and international organizations like
the United Nations were given significant authority to enforce developing
human rights norms.54
Much had also changed within domestic law. The Supreme Court
eviscerated the general federal common law in its landmark decision, Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,55 significantly curtailing the ability of the federal
courts to craft their own substantive law.56 The United States was on the brink
of a civil rights revolution that would fundamentally alter the way the
government interacted with citizens.57 Individuals also came to be viewed
differently by international custom: They became direct operators of
international law alongside states, which had previously been the lone direct
participants.58 Generally speaking, international law had also moved from the
subject of niche treatises to a complex, increasingly sophisticated body of
53 MICHAEL FREEMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 32–35 (2002). The nation’s
involvement in the Nuremberg Trials, for example, marked an important change in the way the United States
viewed legal structures around the world. For a sophisticated look at the legacy of the Nuremberg Trials in
United States law, see Sandra Coliver, Bringing Human Rights Abusers to Justice in U.S. Courts: Carrying
Forward the Legacy of the Nuremberg Trials, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689 (2006).
54 See FREEMAN, supra note 53, at 42–51.
55 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
56 See infra Part II.B.1.i.
57 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 12–13 (1990) (“Between the New Deal and
the 1980s the United States witnessed a rights revolution . . . . [I]nspired by the civil rights movement,
Congress created regulatory programs as a means of furnishing government protection against the multiple
hazards of industrialized society.”); accord id. at 24–46.
58 DAVID BEDERMAN, THE SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 89 (2002) (“[T]he real revolution in the
subjects of international law has been in the recognition of individuals as capable of both exercising
international rights and respecting international obligations. This development, standing alone, has been what
transformed a law of nations—the exclusive preserve of states, national interests, and sovereignty—into
today’s dynamic international law. Persons are no longer the passive objects of international legal action,
things on which states act at their whim.”). Although Bederman and others saw the evolution of rights as
somewhat linear—running from state recognition only to both state and individual recognition—others saw the
development of the law in this field as somewhat cyclical. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (“That the individual’s status in international law has
been in flux since section 1350 was drafted explains in part the current mix of views about private party
liability. Through the 18th century and into the 19th, writers and jurists believed that rules of international law
bound individuals as well as states. In the 19th century, the view emerged that states alone were subjects of
international law, and they alone were able to assert rights and be held to duties devolved from the law of
nations. Under that view—which became firmly entrenched both in doctrine and in practice—individual rights
existed only as rights of the state, and could be asserted, defended or withdrawn by the state. In this century,
once again writers have argued that both the rights and duties of international law should be applied to private
parties. However, their discussions are more prescriptive than descriptive; they recognize shifts in firmly
entrenched doctrine but are unable to define a clear new consensus. And for each article sounding the arrival of
individual rights and duties under the law of nations, another surveys the terrain and concludes that there is a
long distance to go.” (citations omitted)).
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law.59 Not least among the changes in international law was a widespread
codification of the law of nations, a trend recognized by scholars as early as the
1910s.60
Against that backdrop of change, the Alien Tort Statute received its first
substantive mention in a judicial opinion in more than 165 years when, in
1960, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Khedivial Line,
S.A.E. v. Seafarers’ International Union.61 In that case, the Court of Appeals
was asked to consider whether the owners of a foreign ship could sue the local
chapter of a union for organizing a protest of the ship’s workers.62 In a per
curiam opinion, the court briefly considered whether the Alien Tort Statute

59 See Symposium, The Politics of International Regime Complexity, 7 PERSP. ON POL. 13 (2009); Joel P.
Trachtman, The International Economic Law Revolution, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 33, 40–43 (1996) (noting
the decline in the private international law). Notably, judges and scholars have wrestled with the role of
international law in domestic courts throughout the nation’s history. E.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163
(1894) (“International law . . . — including not only . . . the law of nations; but also questions arising under . . .
private international law . . . — is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice . . . .”); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) ( “[T]he Court is bound by the law of nations,
which is a part of the law of the land.”).
60 See Ernest Nys, The Codification of International Law, 5 AM. J. INT’L L. 871, 885 (1911) (“In the
second half of the nineteenth century the idea of the utility of codification in the domain of the relations
between states was sustained by publicists, by statesmen, and by learned men devoted to pacific ideas. These
latter strove above all for set occasions for holding organized conferences in the different countries,
conferences which would result in establishing powerful institutions such as the Permanent International
Bureau of Peace and the Interparliamentary Union.”); see also id. at 882 (“A powerful democratic movement
was felt throughout almost the entire European continent in 1848. Among the reforms and advances which
were demanded by public opinion were to be found going hand in hand with generous dreams, steps to the
realization of which reactionary forces were able doubtless to oppose themselves during some time to come,
but which in the end spelt the certainty of final triumph. One of these noble ideas was the codification of
judicial rules for the relations of states.”). But see DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 117–67
(2010) (arguing that custom is alive and well within the spheres of both public and private international law).
See generally George W. Wickersham, The Codification of International Law, 4 FOREIGN AFF. 237, 242–43
(1926) (“[E]fforts to formulate principles of international law and to secure general agreement upon them by
civilized states have been made and are being continued at the present time. A century ago, the great English
law reformer, Jeremy Bentham, began to agitate for the codification of international law. Sixty or seventy
years after Bentham wrote, David Dudley Field published a code of international law, the inadequacy of which
for present uses furnishes suggestions of the difficulties of anticipating the future relations of nations, as well
as of making a code from the standpoint of one country alone, to say nothing of the task of reconciling
differences of language, and of varying conceptions of legal principles in a code designed to govern all or at
least a number of civilized nations.”). For more information on the use of international law in United States
courts, see INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE (David L. Sloss et
al. eds., 2011).
61 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960) (per curiam).
62 Id. at 50. The panel consisted of Chief Judge Joseph Edward Lumbard and Judges Leonard Moore and
Henry Friendly. Id. Judge Friendly would later write the majority opinion in another notable Alien Tort Statute
case, IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
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could provide a sound basis for the injunctive relief sought.63 Noting first that
“[d]espite the age of this section authorities applying it are scant,”64 the panel
went on to reject jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute.65 The decision
turned not on whether the law of nations applied to the defendant—at that time
the most prominent question in Alien Tort Statute cases—but on whether the
law of nations outlawed the defendant’s behavior at all.66 Two important
sentences in the per curiam opinion set the stage for future Alien Tort Statute
litigation:
Plaintiff has presented no precedents or arguments to show either that
the law of nations accords an unrestricted right of access to harbors
by vessels of all nations or that, if it does, this is a right of the foreign
national rather than solely of the nation. In any event the law of
nations would not require more than comity to the ships of a foreign
67
nation . . . .

In a footnote, the panel cited international law as it exists through custom and
treatises, pointedly noting that the United States was not a party to the central
international convention on the matter.68
Although Khedivial’s significance has not been fully embraced by literature
discussing the Alien Tort Statute,69 the case left a lasting legacy in the field.
Prior to Khedivial, the statute had primarily been used to provide jurisdiction
for well-established, easily defined claims.70 In Khedivial, however, the
Second Circuit had to first determine whether the tort claim itself existed
before it could determine whether a particular plaintiff had jurisdiction to bring
suit under the statute.71 The plaintiff in Khedivial asserted jurisdiction based on
an innovative tort claim arising under the Alien Tort Statute so, for the first
time, a court wrestled with whether a tort existed within the law of nations,

63

Khedivial, 278 F.2d at 50, 51–52.
Id. at 52.
65 Id. The court also distinguished the only other case that had ever upheld jurisdiction under the statute,
Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607). Khedivial, 278 F.2d at 52. The main distinction
between the two cases, according to the court in Khedivial, is that there was a violation of treaty obligations in
Bolchos but there was no such violation in Khedivial. Id.
66 See Khedivial, 278 F.2d at 52.
67 Khedivial, 278 F.2d at 52 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
68 Id. at 52 n.1.
69 For instance, Khedivial was not mentioned at all in the Supreme Court’s first substantive decision on
the Alien Tort Statute, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
70 See, e.g., Bolchos, 3 F. Cas. at 810 (discussing the Alien Tort Statute in a paragraph devoted
exclusively to the jurisdiction of the court).
71 See Khedivial, 278 F.2d at 52.
64
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rather than simply deciding whether the law of nations applied to the case
before it.72 Courts would continue to struggle with defining the law of nations
for the next fifty years.
Through the rest of the 1960s and into the early 1970s, courts dabbled in
the Alien Tort Statute without providing any meaningful guidance on how to
identify its boundaries.73 As a result, courts confronting the statute had the
freedom to conjure up innovative tests to determine what behavior was
protected by the “law of nations.” In 1963, for example, the District Court for
the District of Pennsylvania was asked to decide whether a ship’s poor
condition violated the law of nations.74 The court held that there was not a
violation of the law of nations, and in the process it crafted an especially
interesting two-part test that focused on the structural concerns of public
international law:
[T]he conclusion of this court is that the phrase ‘in violation of the
law of nations,’ for the purpose of deciding this issue, means, inter
alia, at least a violation by one or more individuals of those
standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship between
states or between an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by
75
those states for their common good and/or in dealings inter se.

In reaching this state action view, the district court considered legal treatises
contemporary to the Alien Tort Statute authored by, among others, James Kent
and Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui.76 The state action view was occasionally cited

72

Id. at 51, 52.
The most notable case from this period is Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961). There, an
alien brought suit against his ex-wife for forging their daughter’s passport and making other misstatements in
the immigration process when she entered the United States with their daughter. Id. at 859, 861, 864. The court
found that—for only the second time ever—jurisdiction existed under the Alien Tort Statute. Id. at 865. Aside
from that case, there were only a handful of interesting musings about the statute. See, e.g., Nguyen Da Yen v.
Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1201 n.13 (9th Cir. 1975) (“The illegal seizure, removal and detention of an alien
against his will in a foreign country would appear to be a tort and it may well be a tort in violation of the ‘law
of nations.’ . . . We are reluctant to decide the applicability of § 1350 to this case without adequate briefing.
Moreover, we are reluctant to rest on it in any event. The complaint presently does not join the adoption
agencies as defendants. . . . We are unaware whether such joinder is feasible.” (citation omitted)).
74 Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
75 Id. at 297.
76 Id. (citing 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 1 (N.Y., O. Halstead 1826)); id. at 296
(citing 1 JEAN-JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 164 (trans. Thomas Nugent, Dublin,
John Rice rev. & corr. 5th ed. 1791) (1764)).
73
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in later cases,77 although neither this test nor any other developed a significant
following through the 1970s.
In many ways, confusion regarding the sudden revival of a long-dormant
statute was predictable and understandable. Federal courts had been given no
guidance by the Supreme Court on the proper interpretation of this arcane
statute, but, in the Supreme Court’s defense, it had few opportunities to
provide meaningful guidance.78 For the Alien Tort Statute to develop in a
meaningful way, a federal court would have to inject force into the statute.
D. A Major Paradigm Shift: Filartiga v. Pena-Irala
The Alien Tort Statute finally received the jolt of energy that it needed in
1980, when the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided the landmark
case Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.79 The case began with a suit by Dr. Joel Filartiga,
a Paraguayan immigrant living in America, against Norberto Pena-Irala, also a
Paraguayan immigrant.80 Filartiga alleged that Pena, while serving as Inspector
General of the local police, had tortured and killed Filartiga’s son in
Paraguay.81 Filartiga’s daughter learned of Pena’s presence in the United
States—and the fact that he had overstayed his visa—and notified United
States officials.82 She served Pena with a complaint as he was awaiting
deportation in the Brooklyn Navy Yard.83 Filartiga argued that he had
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute because torture, and specifically the
brutal torture inflicted on his son, clearly violated the law of nations.84

77 See, e.g., Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30–31 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting a “general consensus” that
the law of nations “deals primarily with the relationship among nations rather than among individuals” and
“has been held not to be self-executing so as to vest a plaintiff with individual legal rights”).
78 In the thirty years prior to Filartiga, the Alien Tort Statute was only meaningfully discussed in an
opinion by the Courts of Appeals six times. Three of those opinions were never appealed to the Supreme
Court; Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir.
1975); Khedivial, S.A.E. v. Seafarers’ Int’l Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960) (per curiam). Three were
appealed, but it is unclear whether the Alien Tort Statute was raised in the petitions for writ of certiorari.
Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 114 (1979);
Dreyfus, 534 F.2d 24; Abiodun v. Martin Oil Serv., Inc., 475 F.2d 142 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866
(1973) (noting that Justice William O. Douglas voted to grant certiorari).
79 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
80 Id. at 878.
81 Id.
82 Id. 878–79.
83 Id. at 879.
84 Id.
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In his brief to the Second Circuit, Pena explicitly argued for a jurisdictional
view of the Alien Tort Statute. He first argued that Filartiga’s claim “cannot be
said to ‘arise under’ any statute of the United States [because a] case does not
‘arise under’ a jurisdictional statute . . . .”85 The brief went on to argue that
jurisdictional provisions included in the Judiciary Act are categorically not
self-executing but instead track the language from the Constitution providing
jurisdiction to federal courts over claims defined by Congress.86 The brief
concluded with a lengthy argument about the separation-of-powers concerns
raised by judicial intrusion on foreign relations.87
The Second Circuit expressly requested the views of the Department of
State, which weighed in on behalf of Filartiga.88 Citing many of the same
sources as the plaintiffs, the State Department argued that the evolving law of
nations could be enforced in federal court, and that torture by government
officials clearly violated the law of nations as it existed in 1980.89
A panel of the Second Circuit unanimously held that it had jurisdiction
under the Alien Tort Statute.90 In an opinion authored by Judge Irving
Kaufman, the panel employed a definition of the law of nations that had
become popular through the landmark Supreme Court decisions United States
v. Smith91 and The Paquete Habana.92 The law of nations, according to those
cases, could be divined using:
[T]he customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of
these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of
labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well
acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are
resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their
authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy
93
evidence of what the law really is.

85 Brief of Defendant-Appellee in Support of Judgment of Dismissal at 7, Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876 (No.
79-6090), 1979 WL 200206.
86 See id. at 27.
87 Id. at 28–33.
88 Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876 (No. 79-6090),
1980 WL 340146.
89 Id. at 3.
90 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
91 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
92 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
93 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880–81 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
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The court also relied on The Paquete Habana to inform its decision that
“courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has
evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.”94 Because the
behavior in question—torture in retaliation for Filartiga’s political activity—
clearly violated the law of nations, the panel held that Filartiga had stated a
valid cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute.95
In arriving at that conclusion, the panel explicitly dismissed Pena’s
argument that the Alien Tort Statute was purely jurisdictional. Pena’s
“extravagant claim” that the “law of nations forms a part of the laws of the
United States only to the extent that Congress has acted to define it” fails, the
court held, because of “the numerous decisions applying rules of international
law uncodified in any act of Congress.”96 The Second Circuit unequivocally
adopted customary international law as federal common law,97 a noteworthy
event in the development of international law in United States courts.98
If previous Alien Tort Statute decisions had failed to spark meaningful
interest within the bar or academia, the ambitious ruling99 in Filartiga put an
94

Id. at 881 (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796)).
Id. at 884.
96 Id. at 886 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677; Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199).
97 Id. at 885. The wholesale adoption of international custom as federal common law in Filartiga is one
of the most notable proclamations of the “modern position” that customary international law is part of federal
common law. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law: A Critique of the Modernist Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 815, 831–34, 837 (1997). Professors
Bradley and Goldsmith describe Filartiga as one of the “twin pillars” of the modern position. Id. at 849
(arguing that Filartiga and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law are the central twin pillars of the
modern position); accord id. at 831.
98 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 97, at 851 (“No court prior to Filartiga in 1980 ever held that
[customary international law] was part of the ‘Laws of the United States’ within the meaning of Article
III . . . .”).
99 The Second Circuit panel in Filartiga, well aware of the importance of their decision, did not
downplay the significance of their position as they waxed poetic in the final sentences of their unanimous
opinion:
95

In the modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations have combined to lead the nations
of the world to recognize that respect for fundamental human rights is in their individual and
collective interest. Among the rights universally proclaimed by all nations, as we have noted, is
the right to be free of physical torture. Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has
become—like the pirate and slave trader before him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all
mankind. Our holding today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by our First
Congress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people
from brutal violence.
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890.
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end to that slumber.100 Almost instantly, academics and judges leapt to the
challenge of defining this arcane statute.101 The significance of the Second
Circuit’s decision in Filartiga was certainly not lost on its contemporary
audience, nor have later scholars understated its importance.102
The Second Circuit’s opinion attempted to settle many of the procedural,
jurisdictional, and constitutional questions that had festered in previous cases,
including many that would continue to arise over the coming decades. Among
those clarifications were holdings that: (1) a broad reading of the statute did
not violate various Article III constraints;103 (2) the law of nations was
essentially self-executing;104 and (3) the law of nations was not limited to the
rules of interaction between states.105 If the Second Circuit’s arguments held,
as the Filartiga court hoped they would, federal courts would be primed to
finally define the contours of this long-standing provision. That 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 finally had an evocative label—the Alien Tort Statute—did not hurt its
popularity.106 Filartiga, “[t]ruly a case of landmark proportions,”107 set the
stage for future litigation surrounding the statute, including the D.C. Circuit’s
noteworthy opinion four years later in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.108
100 E.g., Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights
Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53 (1981); Farooq Hassan,
International Human Rights Law and the Alien Tort Statute: Past and Future, 5 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 131 (1982);
Lisa A. Rickard, Note, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: A New Forum for Violations of International Human Rights, 30
AM. U. L. REV. 807 (1981). Although Filartiga injected significant force into the Alien Tort Statute, some
scholars and judges would continue to question whether the Alien Tort Statute was a serious tool for enforcing
human rights norms or merely “historical trivia.” E.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring); Debra A. Harvey, Comment, The Alien Tort Statute: International
Human Rights Watchdog or Simply “Historical Trivia”?, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 341, 367 (1988)
(concluding that the Alien Tort Statute “should not be characterized as an obsolete relic” because it could
satisfy an “urgent need” in the world and potentially transform international human rights).
101 Supra note 100.
102 E.g., David J. Bederman, Dead Man’s Hand: Reshuffling Foreign Sovereign Immunities in U.S.
Human Rights Litigation, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 255, 256 (1995–96) (“In a sense, all current human
rights litigation owes its fortune to Filartiga.”); Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights
Litigation, 2 U. CHI. J. INT’L L. 457, 457 (2001) (“International human rights litigation in US courts largely
began in 1980, with . . . Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.”); see also KENNETH C. RANDALL, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PARADIGM 33–34 (1990).
103 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885.
104 See id. at 886–87.
105 Id. at 885, 890.
106 Filartiga features the first use of the term “Alien Tort Statute” in a published opinion, although the
appellee’s brief in that case also featured the now-popular phrase. See Defendant Appellee’s Brief in Support
of Judgment of Dismissal at 17, 21, 27, 33, Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876 (No. 79-6090), 1979 WL 200206. It is
unclear where that term originated, as it also had not been previously used in popular scholarly articles.
107 RANDALL, supra note 102, at 33.
108 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
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E. Filartiga’s Progeny: Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic
The next major test of the Alien Tort Statute revealed how little the Second
Circuit’s decision had actually settled the important jurisdictional question
surrounding the statute. In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,109 the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit considered a claim brought by several Israeli
citizens alleging torture and abuse regarding the infamous Coastal Road
Massacre of March 11, 1978.110 Thirteen armed members of the Palestinian
Liberation Organization landed by boat along a highway between Haifa and
Tel Aviv in Israel and captured two civilian buses, a taxicab, and a passing
car.111 Over several hours, the terrorists raced down the highway torturing
passengers in the bus and shooting anyone in sight, killing thirty-four people
and wounding eighty-seven.112 At the time, it was “the worst terrorist attack in
Israel’s history.”113 Several survivors brought suit in district court under 28
U.S.C. § 1350, among other statutes.114
Judges Harry Edwards, Robert Bork, and Charles Henry Robb released a
short, unanimous per curiam opinion affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the
case for lack of jurisdiction.115 The panel also released three lengthy, largely
divergent concurring opinions that set out each judge’s reasons for affirming
the trial court. Those concurring opinions would go on to become influential
expositions on the different approaches to the Alien Tort Statute.116 Judge

109 Notably, certiorari was denied after the Court invited the Solicitor General to express the views of the
United States. Compare 469 U.S. 811 (1984) (order calling for the views of the Solicitor General), with 470
U.S. 1003 (1985) (order denying certiorari). The Solicitor General recommended that the Court deny the
petition for certiorari, noting that review by the Supreme Court was premature based on the relative lack of
case law on the matter and the rapidly changing landscape. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 9–11,
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, No. 83-2052 (Jan. 30, 1985); see also BETH STEPHENS ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 12 n.51 (2d ed. 2008).
110 For background information on the Coastal Road Massacre, see A Sabbath of Terror, TIME, Mar. 20,
1978, at 25.
111 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776; see also A Sabbath of Terror, supra note 110, at 25.
112 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776; see also A Sabbath of Terror, supra note 110, at 25.
113 A Sabbath of Terror, supra note 110, at 25.
114 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775. Plaintiffs also sought jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1331, and
1332. Id. Section 1330 provides jurisdiction to federal courts under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
§ 1331 provides federal question jurisdiction to federal courts for “all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” and § 1332 provides for diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1330–1332 (2012).
115 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775.
116 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728, 731, 732 (2004) (quoting Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at
813 (Bork, J., concurring); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 781 (Edwards, J., concurring)) (citing Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at
774 (per curiam) (noting that the differing approaches to the Alien Tort Statute are not new to the federal
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Bork’s concurring opinion garnered the most attention; he argued that the
Alien Tort Statute should be read as a purely jurisdictional statute.117 His
opinion is also notable as the first time the purely jurisdictional position was
adopted in a published opinion. Judge Bork read 28 U.S.C. § 1350 to “only
confer[] jurisdiction to adjudicate those [cases] arising from other sources
which satisfy its limiting provisions.”118 He had several concerns about the
Alien Tort Statute as a cause-of-action-creating statute, but those concerns can
largely be grouped into two categories: separation-of-powers concerns and
political question concerns.
Judge Bork first took aim at the tendency of courts to aggrandize their own
power by expanding their jurisdiction, which violates the principle of
separation of powers.119 He highlighted the long-standing presumption that
federal courts will not expand their jurisdiction unless explicitly authorized by
clear statutory language.120 Because the statute “does not embody a legislative
judgment that is either current or clear,” Judge Bork believed that courts
should err on the side of minimizing their own jurisdiction until Congress
clearly states otherwise.121 Second, Judge Bork noted his belief that United
States courts were neither permitted nor well-equipped to make significant
policy judgments that intertwine with the decision to grant a new cause of
action.122 Creating causes of action in the Alien Tort Statute context is an
“impossibility . . . without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion.”123
Despite his general reservations about creating new causes of action, Judge
Bork acknowledged that the Alien Tort Statute could be read to allow claims
that would have fallen under the “law of nations” when the statute was
enacted.124 Citing Blackstone’s famous Commentaries, Judge Bork noted that
principal offenses included: (1) violations of safe conducts; (2) infringement of
the rights of ambassadors; and (3) piracy.125 Although Judge Bork tempered

courts)); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 150, 155, 164–65, 172, 173 (2d Cir. 2010)
(Leval, J., concurring in the judgment), aff’d on other grounds, No. 10-1491, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2013).
117 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 798–99 (Bork, J., concurring).
118 Id. at 811 (quoting Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 249 (1951)).
119 Id. at 799.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 813, 816.
122 Id. at 802–03.
123 Id. at 803 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
124 Id. at 813–15.
125 Id. at 813 (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 35, *68).
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his position slightly by allowing for the three original violations, history would
remember his opinion for his general approach.126
Judge Edwards closely followed the methodology that the Second Circuit
in Filartiga used. He affirmed the dismissal of the suit because: (1) the law of
nations did not clearly prohibit terrorism; and (2) the Alien Tort Statute only
applied to states and state actors.127 Regarding the former, he noted that
“nations of the world are so divisively split on the legitimacy of such
aggression as to make it impossible to pinpoint an area of harmony or
consensus.”128 Regarding the latter, and perhaps the more notable point, Judge
Edwards held that torture by non-state actors was not a clearly established
violation of international custom.129 He addressed Judge Bork’s jurisdictional
claim quickly, noting that:
The decision in Filartiga did not hold that, under section 1350, the
law of nations must provide a cause of action—that is, a right to
sue—in order to find jurisdiction. The existence of an express or
implied cause of action was immaterial to the jurisdictional analysis
of the Second Circuit. By focusing on this issue, Judge Bork has
skirted the threshold question whether the statute even requires that
the law of nations grant a cause of action. I do not believe that the
statute requires such a finding, or that the decision in Filartiga may
130
be lightly ignored.

Judge Edwards later stepped out from the cover of Filartiga and challenged the
merits of Judge Bork’s argument. While Judge Bork argued that the political
questions involved are better left to Congress, Judge Edwards argued that the
decision to give political questions to the courts is itself a determination best
left to Congress.131 Judge Edwards likewise construed the statute as a mandate
from Congress and viewed an abdication of that mandate as improper.132 Judge
Robb filed a comparatively short concurring opinion133 that focused primarily
126

See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 171.
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775, 795–96 (Edwards, J., concurring).
128 Id. at 795.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 780–81.
131 See id. at 789 (“If Congress determined that aliens should be permitted to bring actions in federal
courts, only Congress is authorized to decide that those actions ‘exacerbate tensions’ and should not be
heard.”).
132 Id. at 790 (“I am the first to admit that section 1350 presents difficulties in implementation, but to
construe it out of existence on [separation-of-powers] ground[s] is to usurp Congress’[s] role and contravene
its will.”).
133 Id. at 823–27 (Robb, J., concurring).
127
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on “the inherent inability of federal courts to deal with cases such as this
one.”134 His functional approach to the Alien Tort Statute stemmed from a
belief that courts should not be in the business of determining “the
international status of terrorist acts,” especially when “such a review forces
[courts] to dignify by judicial notice the most outrageous of the diplomatic
charades that attempt to dignify the violence of terrorist atrocities . . . .”135
Judge Robb noted that cases like Tel-Oren force courts to make serious
diplomatic decisions that should be left to the political branches.136
The divergent views laid out in Tel-Oren came as a surprise to some
scholars and lawmakers. Congress, for its part, sought to ensure that the Alien
Tort Statute could provide at least a limited cause of action for certain basic
human rights abuses and quickly passed the Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991.137 The Torture Victim Protection Act—an explicit reaction to the
uncertainty created by Tel-Oren—provides for a cause of action against
individuals alleged to have committed torture or extrajudicial killings.138
Although the Torture Victim Protection Act provided some individuals with a
clear-cut right of action under the Alien Tort Statute, the act generally did little
to settle the broader theoretical debate that had raged in Tel-Oren.139
As a whole, Tel-Oren is notable for bringing forth the purely jurisdictional
view of the Alien Tort Statute and for bringing several important issues to the
forefront of the debate. The fractured panel addressed many of the issues that
other federal courts were handling in similar Alien Tort Statute cases, but the
Tel-Oren judges were unable to reach agreement on the most important

134

Id. at 823.
Id.
136 Id. at 824 (“Judge Bork’s opinion finds it necessary to treat the international status of the P.L.O., and
to suggest that the organization bears significantly on the foreign relations of the United States. This is
considerably more in the way of official recognition than this organization has ever before gained from any
institution of the national government.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
137 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992). For information on
Congress’s reaction to Tel-Oren, see Philip Mariani, Assessing the Proper Relationship Between the Alien Tort
Statute and the Torture Victim Prevention Act, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1392–93 (2008).
138 See 137 CONG. REC. 2670 (1991) (statement of Sen. Arlen Spector) (“[T]he Terrorism Victim
Protection Act of 1991 . . . will provide Federal jurisdiction for victims of torture . . . . One might think . . . it
would be unnecessary to have legislation on such a subject, because torture is such a heinous offense . . . that
the courts would have jurisdiction without a formal legislative measure. This is necessary because . . . a
decision by the court of appeals for the District of Columbia circuit captioned Tel-Oren . . . .”); see also Bellia
& Clark, supra note 23, at 460–61.
139 Bellia & Clark, supra note 23, at 460–61.
135
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questions. In the decision’s wake, courts flirted with the jurisdictional view,140
but no judges offered a full defense of the jurisdictional view espoused by
Judge Bork. Courts failed to coalesce around a single view of the Alien Tort
Statute and struggled with its scope and depth in the years following TelOren.141
F. Eventual Crystallization: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
In 2004, the Supreme Court finally took on the Alien Tort Statute.
Weighing in 215 years after the statute was originally passed, the Supreme
Court found that the Alien Tort Statute was not only a jurisdictional statute, but
also permitted a subset of the law of nations to serve as valid causes of action
in domestic courts. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain involved a suit by Humberto
Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican physician, against Drug Enforcement Agency
officials and Mexican nationals who abducted him in his hometown in
Mexico.142 In the late-1980s, the federal government came to believe that
Alvarez had been involved with the torture and murder of a Drug Enforcement
Agency official in Guadalajara.143 After he was indicted by a grand jury in
1990, the United States government reached out to the Mexican government
for help bringing Alvarez to trial in the United States.144 The Mexican
government refused to help, and the Drug Enforcement Agency hired Mexican
nationals, including Jose Francisco Sosa, to abduct Alvarez and bring him to
federal authorities located in Texas.145 Once in the United States, Alvarez
moved to dismiss the charges against him, alleging that the United States
government had violated the extradition treaty between the United States and

140 E.g., Jaffe v. Boyles, 616 F.Supp. 1371, 1378 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (“The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1350
are jurisdictional; they do not create a cause of action for a plaintiff seeking recovery under a treaty.” (citing
Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1976)); see also Martin H. Redish, Specific Grants of Federal
Question Jurisdiction, in 15 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 104.24[2], at 104-86.16(2)(a)
n.1 (3d ed. 2012); 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3585, at 767
n.11 (3d ed. 2008).
141 See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (labeling the Alien Tort Statute
an “obscure section of the Judiciary Act” that “may conceivably have been meant to cover only private,
nongovernmental acts,” but also addressing how the outcome of the case would be similar if the statute
covered state acts as well (emphasis added)); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (N.D. Cal.
1987) (“As the cases and commentaries recognize, the history of the Alien Tort Statute is obscure.” (citing IIT
v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975)).
142 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697–98 (2004).
143 Id. at 697. Alvarez, a physician, allegedly prolonged the life of the DEA agent “in order to extend the
interrogation and torture.” Id. (citing United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992)).
144 Id. at 697–99.
145 Id. at 698.
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Mexico, and that the behavior of the Drug Enforcement Agency constituted
“outrageous government conduct.”146 The district court dismissed the
indictment and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision, but the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the nature of Alvarez’s seizure did not affect federal
courts’ jurisdiction.147 On remand, his claim was dismissed by the trial judge at
the conclusion of the government’s case against him.148 Upon returning to
Mexico in 1993, Alvarez brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act and
the Alien Tort Statute.149
The majority opinion, authored by Justice David Souter and joined in
various parts by between four and eight of his colleagues, first noted the Alien
Tort Statute features many characteristics of a jurisdictional statute, but is
ultimately more than purely jurisdictional.150 The principal argument advanced
by the majority is that a purely jurisdictional statute would have been
“stillborn” at the time of its creation due to the absence of any specific causeof-action-granting secondary statute.151 Because there were no statutes enacted
soon after the Alien Tort Statute explicitly authorizing causes of action under
the statute, the majority in Sosa assumed some causes of action must have been
built into the statute at the time of its enactment.152 To solve the conflict
between a statute that is jurisdictional but also somehow “live” at the time of
enactment, the majority merged arguments from two of the three concurring
opinions in Tel-Oren.153 Looking to Judge Bork’s opinion, the Sosa majority
recognized the types of behavior that would violate the law of nations in 1789:
piracy, actions against ambassadors, and violations of safe conducts.154 The
Court went one step further and, looking to Judge Edwards’ opinion, held that
new violations could be covered by the statute if they meet certain heightened
requirements:

146

Id. (quoting Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 658).
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 670.
148 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 714.
151 Id.
152 See id.
153 Compare Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring) (noting Blackstone’s three original law of nations violations), and id. at 788–89 (Edwards, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the Alien Tort Statute should be read to incorporate developing torts), with Sosa, 542
U.S. at 715 (noting the relevance of Blackstone’s three original violations and the continuing development of
the statute).
154 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715.
147
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[W]e think courts should require any claim based on the present-day
law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by
the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the
155
features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.

The Supreme Court’s two principal criteria—heightened specificity and
widespread acceptance—are both required for recognition of a new tort,156 but
the Court also noted that these two factors are not dispositive of a claim.157
Recognition of a new cause of action “should (and, indeed must) involve an
element of judgment about the practical consequences of making that cause
available to litigants in the federal courts.”158 In a pair of footnotes,159 the
Court suggested a handful of practical consequences that courts could consider,
such as “whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation
of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued,”160 whether a claimant has
“exhausted any remedies available in the domestic legal system,161 and
whether “case-specific deference to the political branches” is due.162
The Supreme Court’s new standard is as notable for what it included as for
what it excluded. The Court implicitly dismissed the notion that an
international law norm actionable under the Alien Tort Statute had to be
“shockingly egregious”163 or invoke “universal abhorrence.”164 Rather, the
Court left open the possibility that a successful claim could be as well-defined
and well-accepted as genocide or torture—two paradigmatic international law
torts—but not shock the conscience in the same way.165 The Court also
declined to define the law of nations as used in the Alien Tort Statute with any
155

Id. at 725.
See id. at 732 (“[W]e are persuaded that federal courts should not recognize private claims under
federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance
among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted.” (citing U.S. v.
Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 n.a, 163–80 (1820)).
157 See id. at 732 n.20, 733 n.21.
158 Id. at 732–33 (emphasis added).
159 Id. at 732 n.20, 733 n.21.
160 Id. at 732 n.20.
161 Id. at 733 n.21 (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae the European Commission in Support of Neither Party at
24 n.54, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339), 2004 WL 177036).
162 Id.
163 See, e.g., Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[The Alien Tort Statute] applies only to
shockingly egregious violations of universally recognized principles of international law.” (citing Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)).
164 See, e.g., Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 336 (11th Cir. 1992).
165 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 737. The Court noted that its international norm analysis “assumes that Alvarez
could establish that Sosa was acting on behalf of a government when he made the arrest, for otherwise he
would need a rule broader still.” Id.
156
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specificity beyond traditional definitions provided by well-known sources like
The Paquete Habana and Blackstone’s Commentaries.166 The Court did,
however, fold all international law, both public and private,167 into the law of
nations for the purposes of Alien Tort Statute litigation.168 Applying the new
standard, the Court ruled that the behavior of Drug Enforcement Agency
officials in the case before it did not violate the law of nations.169
In a concurring opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia agreed with the Court’s
handling of the three original violations but disagreed with the creation of
future violations based on contemporary international law norms.170 Justice
Scalia’s arguments closely mirrored Judge Bork’s analysis from twenty years
prior, but Justice Scalia seemed especially concerned with judges “converting
what they regard as norms of international law into American law.”171 The
majority did not address Justice Scalia’s political question doctrine-esque
concerns.172
Justice Stephen Breyer wrote his own concurring opinion,173 which was
joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,174 where he added an additional
consideration to the laundry-list of factors to use when determining the
position of international law. He added that courts should consider “notions of
comity that lead each nation to respect the sovereign rights of other nations by
limiting the reach of its laws and their enforcement.”175 In Justice Breyer’s
view, courts should demand procedural and jurisdictional consensus before

166

See id. at 714–15.
For more information on the different types of international law, see, for example, Jack Goldsmith &
Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791
(2009).
168 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714–15.
169 Id. at 738 (“Whatever may be said for the broad principle Alvarez advances, in the present, imperfect
world, it expresses an aspiration that exceeds any binding customary rule having the specificity we require.
Creating a private cause of action to further that aspiration would go beyond any residual common law
discretion we think it appropriate to exercise.” (footnotes omitted)).
170 Id. at 739, 744, 747 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
171 Id. at 750.
172 See id. at 728–31 (majority opinion) (addressing Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion without
mentioning political problems).
173 Id. at 760–63 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
174 Justice Ginsburg authored a concurring opinion that focused on intricacies of the case related to the
Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. at 751–60 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
175 Id. at 761 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
167
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enforcing international norms.176 His concurrence foreshadowed concerns
raised by the Justices several years later in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co.
In Sosa’s wake, courts were left to grapple with a difficult standard for
Alien Tort Statute claims. Aside from the three original internationally
accepted torts—piracy, violations of safe conduct, and infringement on the
rights of ambassadors177—the Alien Tort Statute also provided remedies for
violations of international law norms that were no less definite and no less
accepted in the international community than the original torts.178 The two
required components were supplemented with a seemingly endless number of
“practical consequences” that could weigh against enforcing an international
norm by way of the Alien Tort Statute.179
Furthermore, federal courts were tasked with defining the peripheral
characteristics of the Supreme Court’s new causes of action. For instance,
courts gradually adopted a heightened pleading standard for international law
claims brought under the Alien Tort Statute.180 They also grappled with
defining the appropriate statute of limitations for international law torts181 and
whether foreign plaintiffs must exhaust local remedies before bringing claims
in the United States.182 Among the most well-publicized conflicts were heated

176 Id. at 762 (“Today international law will sometimes similarly reflect not only substantive agreement as
to certain universally condemned behavior but also procedural agreement that universal jurisdiction exists to
prosecute a subset of that behavior.”).
177 Id. at 724 (majority opinion).
178 See id. at 732.
179 Id.
180 See, e.g., Arndt v. UBS AG, 342 F. Supp. 2d 132, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
181 See, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1099–1100 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
182 See, e.g., Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Ron
A. Ghatan, Note, The Alien Tort Statute and Prudential Exhaustion, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1273, 1274 (2011)
(arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s prudential exhaustion doctrine could reduce the number of claims a plaintiff
with a weak nexus to the United States could bring under the Alien Tort Statute). See generally Regina
Waugh, Comment, Exhaustion of Remedies and the Alien Tort Statute, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 555 (2010)
(exploring exhaustion of remedies under international law, which requires seeking relief in the country where
the harm occurred, and discussing how that principal would apply to the Alien Tort Statute).
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debates over whether the Alien Tort Statute permits corporate liability183 or
liability for aiding and abetting heinous crimes.184
G. Limiting Extraterritoriality: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
The Court sought to resolve one of the key questions lingering after Sosa
when it granted certiorari in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. in 2011, but
the case quickly evolved into a wholesale reconsideration of the Alien Tort
Statute. The plaintiffs in Kiobel alleged that corporate defendants had
committed extrajudicial killings, torture, and forced exile185—all claims that
are clearly recognized as violations of the law of nations for the purposes of
Sosa. The Second Circuit panel ruling on Kiobel held that, while the alleged
crimes likely fell within the scope of the Alien Tort Statute, the case must be
dismissed because law of nations does not recognize liability for corporate
defendants.186 The panel’s ruling was plainly at odds with the conclusion
reached by panels on other circuits, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to consider the question.187 The Supreme Court was therefore tasked with
deciding an issue it had only briefly noted in Sosa188: whether corporate
defendants could be held liable for atrocities under the Alien Tort Statute.
Both parties and dozens of amici weighed in on the question of corporate
liability. At oral argument, however, several Justices challenged the
assumption that cases with no obvious ties to the United States could still

183 Compare Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (declining to hold
corporations liable under the Alien Tort Statute), aff’d on other grounds, No. 10-1491 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2013),
with Doe v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (permitting suit against corporations), and
Flomo, 643 F.3d 1013 (same), and Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated, No. 11649, 2013 WL 1704704 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2013) (same), and Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir.
2008) (same).
184 Compare Doe, 654 F.3d 11 (permitting aiding and abetting liability under the Alien Tort Statute), with
Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 2011) (declining to recognize aiding and abetting liability), and
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009) (same). See generally
Andrei Mamolea, The Future of Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A
Roadmap, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 120–32 (2011) (reviewing the conflict over aiding and abetting
liability under the Alien Tort Statute and under international criminal law).
185 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491, slip op. at 2 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2013).
186 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 145 (“Together, those [international law] authorities demonstrate that imposing
liability on corporations for violations of customary international law has not attained a discernible, much less
universal, acceptance among nations of the world in their relations inter se. Because corporate liability is not
recognized as a specific, universal, and obligatory norm, it is not a rule of customary international law that we
may apply under the [Alien Tort Statute].” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
187 132 S. Ct. 472 (mem.) (2011).
188 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004).
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appear in American courts by way of the Alien Tort Statute.189 Known as the
principle of extraterritoriality, this matter had not been addressed in full by
Alien Tort Statute cases in the past. The most vocal challenger was Justice
Samuel Alito, who only a few minutes into the oral argument stated that, in his
view, there was “no particular connection between the events here and the
United States.”190 The crux of his concern, as he would later state it, was “what
business does a case like [this] have in the courts of the United States?”191
Chief Justice John Roberts echoed similar sentiments during oral arguments192
and, once the matter was raised, even Justice Anthony Kennedy seemed
interested in reconsidering whether the Alien Tort Statute had geographic
boundaries.193 Notably, neither Chief Justice Roberts nor Justice Alito was on
the Court when it decided Sosa.194
Six days after oral arguments, the Court requested another round of briefing
and argument on a new question: “Whether and under what circumstances the
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to recognize a cause of
action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a
sovereign other than the United States.”195 The question of extraterritoriality—
whether the Alien Tort Statute has extraterritorial reach—was the subject of
another round of briefing by the parties and by several amici.
In a fourteen-page majority opinion, the Court held that the principle of
extraterritoriality barred suits like the one in Kiobel.196 Writing for a fiveJustice majority, Chief Justice Roberts first acknowledged that the case no
longer turned on whether corporate liability was possible, but instead on
“whether a claim may reach conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign

189 See Adam Liptak, Justices Begin Term by Hearing Case Again, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2012, at A16 (“[At
oral argument] it quickly became clear that some of the justices were interested in addressing a broader
question.”).
190 Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S. Feb. 28,
2012).
191 Id. at 11. Justice Alito would go on to answer his own question: “There’s no connection to the United
States whatsoever.” Id. at 12.
192 E.g., id. at 8 ( “[I]f there is no other country where this suit could have been brought, regardless of
what American domestic law provides, isn’t it a legitimate concern that allowing the suit itself contravenes
international law?”).
193 Id. at 13–14.
194 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
195 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(order restoring the case to the calendar for reargument).
196 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491, slip op. at 14 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2013).
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sovereign.”197 The Court answered that question in the negative, finding that
the “presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the [Alien
Tort Statute], and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.”198 At its
simplest, the presumption against extraterritoriality is a canon of statutory
interpretation that provides that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of
an extraterritorial application, it has none.”199
In light of the presumption, any claims brought under the Alien Tort Statute
must “touch and concern” the United States.200 But it is not enough for a claim
to simply affect objects on United States territory, the claims “must do so with
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application.”201 The majority did little to clarify the remaining scope of the
Alien Tort Statute or to clarify the types of cases that could still proceed under
the statute.
In concurring opinions, several Justices weighed in on the future of the
Alien Tort Statute. Justice Kennedy noted that “[t]he opinion for the Court is
careful to leave open a number of significant questions regarding the reach and
interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute.”202 Soon after the opinion was
released, some commentators read this concurrence to signal that Justice
Kennedy was interested in preserving the Alien Tort Statute in Filartiga-type
cases, meaning those where the United States was the best venue available or
where a strict application of the principle of extraterritoriality may be too
harsh.203
Justice Alito, who had been by far the most vocal advocate for applying the
principle of extraterritoriality during the first round of oral argument in Kiobel,
wrote to clarify his understanding of how the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to the Alien Tort Statute.204 In his view, the
presumption is rather exacting; it would require that the “domestic conduct [be]
sufficient to violate an international law norm that satisfies Sosa’s

197

Id. at 4.
Id. at 13.
199 Id. at 4 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010)).
200 Id. at 14; see also Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883–84.
201 Kiobel, No. 10-1491, slip op. at 14 (citing Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883–88).
202 Id. at 1 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
203 See What is Left of the Alien Tort Statute after Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum? – Podcast, Federalist
Society Podcast (May 13, 2013), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/what-is-left-of-thealien-tort-statute-after-kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum-podcast (comments by Chimène Keitner).
204 Id. at 1–2 (Alito, J., concurring).
198
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requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized nations.”205
Justice Breyer, writing for himself and three other Justices, authored an
opinion concurring in the judgment only, in which he stated that he would not
have applied the presumption against extraterritoriality.206 Instead, he would
apply a nexus-type requirement, where a suit could proceed if “(1) the alleged
tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or (3)
the defendant's conduct substantially and adversely affects an important
American national interest . . . .”207
Kiobel raised as many new questions as it answered. It is clear that the
Alien Tort Statute no longer permits “foreign-cubed” cases, or those that have
foreign plaintiffs suing foreign defendants for acts committed on foreign
soil.208 “Foreign-squared” cases, however, may still have a future in federal
courts under the statute if they touch and concern the United States with
sufficient force,209 including if they feature United States defendants or maybe
even United States corporations.
While Kiobel significantly pared down the number of claims that could be
raised under the Alien Tort Statute, the statute remains a viable tool for
plaintiffs to bring claims under the law of nations. Kiobel also did little to
changing the underlying law of nations analysis outlined in Sosa. If a plaintiff
can satisfy the exacting nexus requirement, Sosa remains at the heart of their
substantive claim.
II. ASSESSING THE HYBRID MODEL
Many of the debates that have lingered in the post-Sosa era have
highlighted shortcomings in the Supreme Court’s framework. Despite the best

205

Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
Id. at 3–6 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
207 Id. at 1–2.
208 See Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains Open to “Foreign Squared” Cases,
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-the-doorremains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases; see also Donald Childress, Kiobel Commentary: An ATS Answer with
Many Questions (and the Possibility of a Brave New World of Transnational Litigation), SCOTUSBLOG (Apr.
18, 2013, 5:03 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-an-ats-answer-with-manyquestions-and-the-possibility-of-a-brave-new-world-of-transnational-litigation; Austen Parrish, Kiobel InstaSymposium: A More Positive Outlook for International Law, OPINIOJURIS (Apr. 24, 2013, 2:45 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/24/kiobel-insta-symposium-2.
209 Hathaway, supra note 208; see also Roger Alford, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: Degrees of Territoriality,
OPINIOJURIS (Apr. 22, 2013, 9:56 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/22/kiobel-insta-symposium-degrees-ofterritoriality (identifying several types of activity that could touch and concern the United States).
206
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intentions of the majority in Sosa, federal courts have struggled to consistently
apply the test devised in Sosa for creating new causes of action. Without the
guidance of a more fully-theorized framework, lower courts have haphazardly
developed tests that lack internal coherence and cause disharmony among the
circuits.
The Alien Tort Statute is considered both jurisdictional and cause-ofaction-granting because the statute provides jurisdiction on its face and
subsequently dictates the causes of action that can be brought under that
jurisdiction.210 A purely jurisdictional approach—the one advocated in this
Comment—would read the statute as merely jurisdictional, leaving Congress
to define claims that could be brought under the statute. This model would rely
on Congress to make both the legal decision about whether a claim has become
part of the law of nations and the political decision about whether United
States foreign policy is best served by recognizing that cause of action in
domestic courts.
The principal flaws in the hybrid model are of two kinds: theoretical and
practical. The theoretical flaws stem from an atheoretical compromise on the
scope of the claims allowable under the statute. Atheoretical decision-making
occurs, as it did in Sosa, when courts construct functional tests but decline to
provide the necessary background information with which to contextualize the
new guidelines.211 Without that necessary context, it is difficult for future
courts to build on the new ruling, making confusion—and an eventual fulltheorized reconceptualization—inevitable. Atheoretical decision-making
occurred in Sosa because the Supreme Court largely ignored two important
theoretical benchmarks that could have securely positioned the Alien Tort
Statute: the principles embodied in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and the
presumption against implied private rights of action. Part II.B will address
these two available theories and then discuss the harm caused by ignoring
them.
On a practical level, the Supreme Court’s current model has been a failed
experiment in judicial rulemaking and has produced wildly differing results on
a number of important questions in lower federal courts. Those courts have
struggled to apply the Supreme Court’s heightened requirements to the
complexities of divining customary international law, and much of the trouble

210
211

See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731–33 (2004).
See infra text accompanying notes 331–336.
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can be traced back to the lack of coherent theory underlying the Sosa standard.
Courts have also struggled with the Sosa standard because of their
longstanding structural difficulties with the sources of customary international
law.
A purely jurisdictional view of the Alien Tort Statute is preferable to the
hybrid model not only because of the latter’s flaws, but also because the
former would provide a more satisfactory resolution to the debates that
currently plague the Alien Tort Statute. A comparison of the two frameworks,
and analysis of their respective takes on contemporary debates, is provided in
Part IV.
A. Assumptions of the Sosa Framework
The hybrid model rests on uncertain theoretical ground. It is therefore
worthwhile to first consider the true underpinnings of the model—and the
assumptions that the hybrid rests upon—before delving into the costs and
benefits of the model itself. The most notable assumption of the hybrid model
is its adoption of the revisionist view of customary international law, meaning
the statute’s purpose and intent constrain the causes of action that can be
brought for violating of the law of nations. The model implicitly rejects the
competing modern viewpoint, which assumes customary international law is
already wholly present in domestic law.
Key questions arising from Sosa are how the law of nations as seen
through the lens of the Alien Tort Statute differs from the law of nations
generally,212 and why the Supreme Court can hold that the Alien Tort Statute is
merely jurisdictional213 but also creates new causes of action.214 This odd result
occurred because the Supreme Court in Sosa implicitly adopted a revisionist
view of international law, instead of the countervailing modern view.
Revisionists believe that customary international law only becomes federal law
when Congress affirmatively and clearly sanctions incorporation of

212 See Kenneth Anderson, The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended
Consequences, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 331, 350 (2009) (“Whatever exactly the law of nations means as an
international law term, it means something different in the hands of American courts [in the context of the
Alien Tort Statute] . . . .”).
213 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 (noting that the Alien Tort Statute is “a jurisdictional statute creating no new
causes of action”).
214 Id. at 712 (“Although we agree the statute is in terms only jurisdictional, we think that at the time of
enactment the jurisdiction enabled federal courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law
of nations and recognized at common law.”).
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international custom.215 The modern view, by comparison, believes that there
has been “a wholesale incorporation of all [customary international law] into
domestic law: [Customary international law] just is federal law, always and
everywhere, and no positive act by a domestic institution is required to make it
effective within the domestic legal system.”216
Although there is some disagreement about whether the Supreme Court
adopted the modern or revisionist view of international law in Sosa,217 that the
Court relied on the history of the Alien Tort Statute to define the contours of
the international law claims which could be brought under the Alien Tort
Statute strongly suggests that the Court adopted the revisionist view.218 The
Court adopted customary international law only with the heightened
requirements of the Alien Tort Statute, a view entirely consistent with the
revisionist position that international law must be affirmatively sanctioned for
use in United States courts.219 If Sosa were to represent the modern view, the
Court “would have to have meant that international norms failing to meet
Sosa’s high standard of definiteness were not simply unactionable under the
[Alien Tort Statute], but not part of [customary international law] at all.”220
The Court took a more modest approach—and intended a more modest
result—by permitting only the international law that was, in its view,
authorized by the Alien Tort Statute.221

215 Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the
Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 886 (2007).
216 Ernest A. Young, Sosa and the Retail Incorporation of International Law, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 28,
28–29 (2007) (citing Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555,
1561 (1984)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111
reporters’ notes 3, at 50 (1987) (noting that “customary international law in the United States is federal law
and its determination by the federal courts is binding on the State courts”).
217 See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 215, at 871. Compare Harold Hongju Koh, The Ninth
Annual John W. Hager Lecture, The 2004 Term: The Supreme Court Meets International Law, 12 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 12 (2004) (espousing the modern position), with Young, supra note 216, at 29 (espousing
the revisionist position).
218 See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 215, at 902–03.
219 See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
220 Young, supra note 216, at 29.
221 Id. (“If [customary international law] just is federal law, then the Alien Tort Statute . . . ought to cover
all [customary international law] claims, so long as they also qualify as torts. But Sosa rejected this view,
holding instead that the [Alien Tort Statute] ‘furnish[es] jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of
actions . . . .’”) (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004)). Paradoxically, the jurisdictional
force of the Alien Tort Statute is much broader than the power of courts to sculpt causes of action.
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The retail incorporation222 of customary international law into United
States law has limited the applicable customary international law to what was
positively authorized by Congress through the Alien Tort Statute.223 Courts are
not only tasked with interpreting whether a particular claim falls within the law
of nations—a difficult task in its own right—but they must also decide whether
a claim falls within “a narrow set of common law actions derived from the law
of nations.”224 This particular subset of the conventional law of nations is
comprised of those violations that can also be brought in federal court due to
their well-defined form and well-accepted status.225 The statute’s other
common name, the Alien Tort Claims Act,226 also provides the impression that
the statute itself is creating tort claims.227
The hybrid model adopted by Sosa was not always the predominant view
among courts. Historians have noted that the framers of the Judiciary Act
would be surprised to discover that a provision of the Judiciary Act, which
focused on the jurisdiction of the federal courts, was itself crafting new causes
of action.228 In Filartiga, the Second Circuit “construe[d] the Alien Tort
Statute, not as granting new rights to aliens, but simply as opening the federal
courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized by international

222

The term “retail incorporation” has been most prominently used by Ernest A. Young. See id. Young
defines the retail incorporation position as the view that “[customary international law] may become federal
law, but only when federal governmental institutions take positive action to make it so.” Id. The opposing
view, supporting the “wholesale incorporation” of customary international law, is the belief that “[customary
international law] just is federal law, always and everywhere, and no positive act by a domestic institution is
required to make it effective within the domestic legal system.” Id. at 28–29.
223 See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 721 (discussing petitioner’s argument).
224 Id. (emphasis added).
225 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
226 Although 28 U.S.C. § 1350 has been most frequently referred to as the Alien Tort Statute after that
term was used throughout Sosa, it is still occasionally referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act. E.g., Douglas
M. Branson, Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable?: Achilles’ Heels in Alien Tort Claims Act
Litigation, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 227 (2011); see also supra note 2.
227 See Bradley, supra note 35, at 592–93.
228 Id. at 593–94. Curtis Bradley states that it is unlikely that the First Congress intended the Alien Tort
Statute to create a cause of action. Id. at 593. Bradley refers to William Casto’s view that such a construction is
“simply frivolous.” Id. (quoting William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts
Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 480 (1986)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In support of this view, Bradley quotes Representative Fisher Ames’s statement that “there is a
substantial difference between the jurisdiction of the court, and the rules of decision” during the House debates
on the Judiciary Act. Id. (quoting 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1357
(Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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law.”229 Filartiga struck a bold modern position, but the framework devised in
that case suffered from many of the same flaws as the later Sosa framework.230
The assumptions and threshold decisions made in Sosa have significant
consequences for the application of the Alien Tort Statute. The most important
assumption is that international law must be incorporated through an
affirmative act of Congress, meaning the intent and purpose of the Alien Tort
Statute are central to the development of causes of action arising under the law
of nations. Pinning the development of federal common law to this ambiguous
statute would topple an already trembling framework.
B. Theoretical Flaws in the Hybrid Model
The Alien Tort Statute’s theoretical framework—the one patched together
in the late-twentieth century and refined by the Supreme Court in 2004—
suffers from a wealth of internal inconsistencies. That it causes some confusion
is hardly surprising based on its long dormancy,231 but the statute’s modern
incarnation is indefensible based on modern views about federal common law
and implied private rights of action. The statute’s theoretical problems center
on the way it expands federal common law without fully rationalizing how the
expansive law of nations fits into existing legal theories. There are certainly
ways for courts to allow for the development of federal common law, but the
Supreme Court in Sosa provided scant support for the development of common
law here and it provided even less support for lower courts looking to
formulate ancillary rules governing constantly evolving international norms.
This Part proceeds by first addressing two important, intersecting bodies of law
that Sosa failed to properly address—the Erie doctrine and the presumption
against implied private rights of action—and then addresses why failure to
properly contextualize Sosa makes it an atheoretical framework. It concludes
by reviewing the harms of atheoretical rulemaking, particularly for a pathbreaking decision like Sosa.

229

Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
For example, the Sosa framework would still require courts to create causes of action out of customary
international law, and those courts would still be disregarding the presumption against implied causes of
action. See infra Parts II.B–C.
231 See supra text accompanying notes 52–60 (discussing legal and political events that significantly
altered the landscape on which the Alien Tort Statute was originally erected).
230
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1. Sosa’s Disregard for Erie Principles
The Sosa majority does its best to extend the original purpose of the Alien
Tort Statute into the modern framework, but the majority fails to properly
account for the role that Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and its progeny played
in reshaping federal judge-made law while the statute lay dormant. Whatever
the original purpose of the statute—a matter that is itself hotly contested232—
Erie has significantly narrowed the scope of permissible federal common law
to the point that it would be entirely foreign to the drafters of the Alien Tort
Statute.233 The Court paid little heed to this paradigm shift, mentioning Erie’s
presumption only among a “series of reasons [that] argue for judicial caution”
when crafting causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute.234
a. The Erie Framework
The true scope of Erie has been simultaneously over- and undervalued.
First-year law students are often told that federal common law has been
abolished in the wake of Erie,235 but a panel of scholars might argue that Erie
did little more than establish that federal courts should apply state law in
diversity cases.236 The true answer lies somewhere in the middle.237 It is clear
that Erie abolished general common law,238 but it is equally clear that specific
areas of federal common law have survived,239 and even thrived.240 Courts

232

See supra Part I.A.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 745 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (“Post-Erie federal common lawmaking (all that is left to the federal courts) is so far removed
from that general-common-law adjudication which applied the ‘law of nations’ that it would be anachronistic
to find authorization to do the former in a statutory grant of jurisdiction that was thought to enable the latter.”).
234 Id. at 725–26 (majority opinion).
235 See Michael Steven Green, Erie’s Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1112 (2011) (noting
the popular misconception that Erie flatly overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)).
236 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
237 The disagreement between Erie fanatics and their detractors may come down to whether one looks
only at the narrow holding of the case or at the way it has been interpreted—or misinterpreted—by courts to
stand for a myriad of different holdings. As an initial matter, it is important not to overstate the relatively
narrow holding of Erie. That case held only that in diversity cases, federal courts should apply state
substantive law. See Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 596 (2008). But see John
Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 695 (1974) (“Erie is by no means simply a
case. Nor would it do it justice to call it a rule or even a principle, for it implicates, indeed perhaps it is, the
very essence of our federalism.” (footnotes omitted)).
238 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (plainly stating that “[t]here is no federal general common law”).
239 Justice Brandeis’ famous line from Erie—that “[t]here is no federal general common law,” id.—is
commonly oversimplified. Rather than clarifying that federal courts have no power to craft common law,
Justice Brandeis meant only to quash the federal general common law:
233
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have established a number of rules restricting the use of federal common law:
It should only fill the gaps left by positive federal law241 or occupy a limited
number of statutorily or constitutionally sanctioned enclaves,242 and it should
develop “consistently with the policy choices reflected in extant federal
law.”243
The two forms of federal common law244—gap-filling and subject-matter
enclaves—are each rooted in their own distinct principles.245 Gap-filling
common law is permitted as a way of ensuring uniform application of essential
federal programs and enforcing the proprietary interests of the federal
government.246 The Alien Tort Statute plainly does not fall within the gapfilling exception of the Erie presumption. Subject-matter enclaves, on the other

Like Erie itself, this phrase had nothing to do with separation of powers or new-myth aversion to
federal common law. “Federal general common law” is different from “federal common law.”
The former refers to a specific kind of judicial decision, exemplified by Swift, which arose
mainly in diversity cases. “Federal common law” is a vague term covering a broader swath of
judicial product. . . . In context, Erie's knell for federal general common law meant only that
Swift was reversed, and for the Court's listed reasons. The Court did not attack federal commonlaw policymaking, and the specialized term “federal general common law” had no relevance
outside Swift and its direct progeny.
Green, supra note 235, at 616–17. Justice Brandeis’ use of the clarifying term “general” was not an accident.
Earlier drafts of the opinion omitted the term, but it was added after the opinion was circulated to other
chambers. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE
JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 106 (2000);
see also Green, supra note 235, at 616 n.111.
240 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.1, at 367 (5th ed. 2007).
241 Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 215, at 879–80.
242 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964). For further discussion of these types
of federal common law, see Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) and Note, An
Objection to Sosa—And to the New Federal Common Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2077, 2081–83 (2006).
243 Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 215, at 880.
244 Federal common law can also be categorized in other ways. Some scholars of federal courts organize
common law rulemaking into one class that “defines primary legal obligations” and another that “shapes
remedies to enforce primary obligations.” RICHARD A. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 608 (6th ed. 2009). That framework highlights the distinction in
the Alien Tort Statute context between the somewhat remarkable task of crafting a brand new cause of
action—a primary legal obligation—and the more routine task of simply shaping the contours of the remedy
for an existing cause of action.
245 Note, supra note 242, at 2081–83.
246 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 240, § 6.1, at 366; Note, supra note 242, at 2081–82. For an example of
proprietary interest, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 240, § 6.2 at 370 (discussing federal common law that
developed around when loss of a federal check constituted theft). This basis for federal common law is also
sometimes known as “interstitial” lawmaking. E.g., Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law,
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1639, 1643 (2008); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Bridging the Gap: Some Thoughts
About Interstitial Lawmaking and the Federal Securities Laws, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 879 (1991).
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hand, tend to spring forth from either constitutional or statutory authorization
and develop in support of more esoteric federal objectives such as foreign
policy247 and policing disputes between states.248 For example, matters of
international relations and foreign policy reside in a post-Erie subject-matter
enclave—particularly as those topics concern the way nations regulate their
interactions with one another and with their constituents.249 The Supreme
Court has noted that common law enclaves are “few and restricted,”250 and
there is a trend among federal courts towards further tightening the contours of
subject-matter enclaves.251 An enclave of common law—like a gap-filling
provision—must still be rooted in an affirmative act of Congress, but courts
may exercise their judgment when effectuating Congressional intent.252
The important question in the Alien Tort Statute context is whether
customary international law relating to private rights of action occupies a
narrow subject-matter enclave, whether custom is authorized by an explicit
statutory provision, or whether it fails to meet the conditions for exemption
from Erie on either ground.253 In Sosa, the Supreme Court gave a split
decision: The statute was jurisdictional on its face,254 but because it occupied a
pre-existing subject-matter enclave—a questionable conclusion—and seemed
to signal some sort of affirmative intent—another questionable conclusion—
federal common law could develop around the statute.
b. Sosa’s Marginalization of Erie
The Court in Sosa noted that a positive authorization of congressional
intent was required to create an enclave of federal common law related to

247

See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 240, § 6.2.4, at 383–85.
See id. § 6.2.5, at 385–87.
249 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 76 (“[F]rom the early decades of the Republic and across changing eras of American legal thought, the
Court has continued to enforce what were traditionally considered perfect rights of sovereign nations (or close
analogues) as a means of upholding key allocation of powers principles.”); cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (“[T]he competence and function of the Judiciary and the National
Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the international community must be treated
exclusively as an aspect of federal law.”).
250 Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963).
251 Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 215, at 881.
252 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 240, § 6.3, at 387.
253 The distinction between these two types of law has been discussed at length and, while most
acknowledge that the distinction is a material one, scholars differ on exactly how to distinguish the two. See,
e.g., Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 167.
254 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
248
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private rights of action.255 Relying on Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
the Court noted the “general practice” of “look[ing] for legislative guidance
before exercising innovative authority over substantive law” because “[i]t
would be remarkable to take a more aggressive role in exercising a jurisdiction
that remained largely in shadow for much of the prior two centuries.”256
Unfortunately, the Court never followed up on the search for legislative
guidance, being largely content to state the standard.
If the Court had followed through with its search for positive authorization
of an “innovative authority,” it would have turned up empty-handed.257 Private
rights of action cannot develop as federal judge-made law because they fail to
meet the requirements that the Court has created for erecting a new common
law enclave. There is certainly reason to believe that the original drafters of the
Judiciary Act meant only to provide federal courts with a broad cognizance to
hear cases, rather than the authority to craft the causes that were permitted
under that grant of jurisdiction.258 Curtis Bradley259 and William Casto260 have
independently explored the legal landscape that existed in 1789, and both
concluded that the Act was “designed to regulate the structure and jurisdiction
of the federal courts, not rights to relief.”261 Casto even went so far as to call
the cause of action construction of the Alien Tort Statute “simply frivolous.”262
Even assuming that the framers of the Judiciary Act held the same
“overarching concern that control over international affairs be vested in the
new national government”263 that the Second Circuit had in Filartiga, that

255

Id. at 727.
Id. at 726.
257 There are two possible sources of modern congressional consent to this reading of the Alien Tort
Statute. The first is Congress’s enactment of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, which can be read to
assume the hybrid view of the Alien Tort Statute. See generally Mariani, supra note 137. Those who want to
find consent for the hybrid view could argue Congress passed the Act under the assumption that the Alien Tort
Statute granted causes of action and only added a note to § 1350 as a way to clarify the intent of Congress on
that specific point of law. A corollary to this principle might be that, by reacting to only one part of the Alien
Tort Statute’s modern interpretation, Congress has implicitly consented to the rest of the Alien Tort Statute
framework developed by federal courts. The second source of modern consent is Congress’s relative inaction
on the matter of the Alien Tort Statute in the face of the judiciary’s general trend of adopting the hybrid view.
See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 100, at 58. If that view holds true, the fact that Congress has not acted to
reverse the federal courts implies congressional consent to the hybrid view.
258 Bradley, supra note 35, at 593–97; see also Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 215, at 887–88.
259 Bradley, supra note 35, at 593–97.
260 Casto, supra note 228.
261 Bradley, supra note 35, at 593; accord Casto, supra note 228, at 478–80.
262 Casto, supra note 228, at 479–80.
263 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
256
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concern must still be filtered through the intermediate Erie formulation. While
the remedy for the First Congress’ concern may have been to vest federal
courts with the jurisdiction to hear a case, and to implicitly provide authority to
develop common law pertaining to international norms, federal courts are no
longer permitted to exercise that type of independent authority.264 The
equivalent solution to the problem that the Founders may have envisaged
would be to give federal courts the jurisdiction to hear claims drafted by
Congress, absent explicit authorization to the contrary.265 Whatever historical
support exists for this position is not certain enough to overcome the modern,
heightened requirements that the Supreme Court has created when looking for
legislative authorization to craft federal judge-made law.266 In the absence of
any clear affirmative authorization from Congress, Erie and its progeny
caution against the development of those rights as federal common law.
2. Rejection of the Presumption Against Implied Private Causes of Action
The Supreme Court undervalued the longstanding presumption against
inferring a private cause of action from the text of the Alien Tort Statute. As a
matter of policy, the presumption against implied private causes of action is
rooted in principles of separation of powers.267 Federal courts are reluctant to
expand their jurisdiction in the absence of explicit authorization from
Congress.268 This restraint has grown stronger in the face of Erie and its
progeny.269 Simply put, courts are no longer “in the free-wheeling days
antedating [Erie],” where federal common law and implied causes of action
could be loosely fashioned at the will of federal judges.270
a. The Supreme Court’s Narrowing Stance
Despite their general hesitancy to recognize implied private causes of
action, courts have occasionally recognized private causes of action in order to

264
265
266
267
268
269
270

393.

See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 240, § 6.3.
See id.
Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 215, at 879; see also notes 250–252 and accompanying text.
Cf. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 240, § 6.3.3, at 392.
Cf. id.
Id.
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963); accord CHEMERINSKY, supra note 240, § 6.3.3, at
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effectuate congressional intent.271 Courts have “taken three different
approaches, each more restrictive than the prior, in deciding when to create
private rights of action.”272 The first approach—and the one most conducive to
development of new implied causes of action—permits recognition of a new
cause of action “where it would help effectuate the purpose for a statute and if
no legislative history mitigated against authorizing such a remedy.”273 This
approach uses the federal common law as an affirmative tool for furthering the
federal interest, rather than as the narrow stop-gap measure that is conventional
today.274
The Supreme Court narrowed the test for implied private causes of action a
decade later with a series of cases275 that culminated with Cort v. Ash.276 In
Cort, the Supreme Court constructed a four-part test for evaluating new
implied causes of action that focuses on tailoring the remedy to the intent of
the statute and to the specific plaintiff seeking relief.277 The test was effective
in limiting the adoption of new implied causes of action; the Court, “for the
most part, . . . refused to create causes of action” under the new test.278

271 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 240, § 6.3.3, at 393 (“There is no dispute that the basic inquiry is whether
Congress intended, explicitly or implicitly, to create a private right of action.”); see, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of
Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Wheeldin, 373 U.S. 647.
272 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 240, § 6.3.3, at 394.
273 Id.
274 Compare J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (“[I]t is the duty of the courts to be alert to
provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose.”), with Corr. Servs. Corp.
v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001)Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004) (“[W]e are reluctant to
infer intent to provide a private cause of action where the statute does not supply one expressly.”).
275 See, e.g., Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 415 (1975) (declining to recognize a
cause of action for professionals looking to attempting to compel agency action); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. Nat’l Ass’n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 464–65 (1974) (declining to recognize a cause of action for
passengers under the Amtrak Act).
276 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
277 Id. at 78 (“First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted—
that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the
cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?” (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
278 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 240, § 6.3.3, at 396. But cf. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (recognizing a cause of action arising from a rule promulgated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (recognizing an implied cause of
action under the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
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Although the Cort test significantly narrowed the Court’s previous
approach,279 there was nonetheless pressure to further tighten the standard.280
The tension between the two positions—one setting a limited but attainable
standard for implied causes of action and the other advocating an even
narrower standard—came to blows in Cannon v. University of Chicago.281
Cannon centered on whether Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
which barred discrimination in education opportunities based on gender,
provided a cause of action to a woman who was allegedly denied access to
medical school based on her gender.282 The Court held that the statute provided
the plaintiff with a valid cause of action because she was “clearly a member of
that class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted.”283 Although the
case is notable as a rare instance in which the Court crafted a cause of action
under the Cort standard, it is also notable for Justice Powell’s influential
dissenting opinion.284 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Powell argued that the
Court should “reappraise [its] standards for the judicial implication of private
causes of action” because the Cort factors “cannot be squared with the doctrine
of separation of powers.”285 Instead, Justice Powell argued the Court should
recognize implied causes of action only with “the most compelling evidence of
affirmative congressional intent.”286 He declined to use implied causes of
action to supplement the purposes of a statute and instead focused on
effectuating only the most plainly stated intent of Congress.287
Justice Powell’s intent-centric approach quickly became the third major
approach to implied causes of action. In 1979, the same year the Court decided
Cannon, it also decided two cases that relied almost exclusively on
congressional intent. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,288 decided one month
after Cannon, the Court declined to adopt a new cause of action under the
Securities and Exchange Act, noting “our task is limited solely to determining
whether Congress intended to create the private right of action

279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288

See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 240, § 6.3.3, at 396.
See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
Id.
Id. at 680–89.
Id. at 694.
Cf. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 240, § 6.3.3, at 396.
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 730 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 731.
Id. at 730–31, 743–46.
442 U.S. 560 (1979).
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asserted . . . .”289 Later that year, in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis,290 the Court again declined to adopt a new cause of action, concluding
that the “dispositive question remains whether Congress intended to create any
such remedy.”291 Throughout the 1980s, the Court continued to depreciate the
Cort framework in favor of a more Touche Ross-like approach. Nearly ten
years after Cort and Touche Ross, two Justices on the Court agreed that “[i]t
could not be plainer that we effectively overruled the Cort v. Ash analysis in
[Touche Ross].”292 Regardless of whether Cort is formally dead, Touche Ross
and its tight standard for the recognition of new causes have overtaken Cort in
the eyes of most federal courts.
The Court continues to adhere closely to the intent of Congress—as seen
through the text and structure of legislation293—although it has also asked for a
remarkable level of specificity before crafting the contours of a private cause
of action. In 2001, the Court again declined to adopt a new implied cause of
action, but it also looked at factors beyond the sometimes-cryptic intent of
Congress.294 In that case, Alexander v. Sandoval, the Court looked for “rightscreating language” in the text of a statute rather than mere legal context
supporting an inference of Congressional intent.295 In defining “rights-creating
language,” the Court provided two illustrative examples: One portion of the
statute in question decreed that “[n]o person . . . shall . . . be subjected to
discrimination,” while another portion of the statute simply limited federal
“agencies to ‘effectuat[ing]’ rights” created in the previous section.296 The first
section features rights-creating language and is targeted towards individuals,
while the second section is simply a directive to federal agencies. The Court
also required rights-creating language that could meet contemporary standards
for specificity; it “expressly rejected the idea that laws adopted between 1964-

289

Id. at 568.
444 U.S. 11 (1979).
291 Id. at 24.
292 Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 188
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
293 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001) (“We therefore begin (and find that we can end) our
search for Congress’s intent with the text and structure of Title VI.”); accord id. (“[L]egal context matters only
to the extent it clarifies text.”); see Transamerica Mort. Advisors, Inc., 444 U.S. at 16 (“[W]e begin with the
language of the statute itself.” (citing, inter alia, Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568; Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441
U.S. 677, 689 (1979))); Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 569 (“The intent of § 17(a) is evident from its face.”).
294 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 284, 293.
295 Id. at 288.
296 Id. at 288–89 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–
d-1 (2000)).
290

BHATIA GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

RECONSIDERING THE PURELY JURISDICTIONAL VIEW

491

1975—the period between [Case v. Borak] and Cort v. Ash—should be
considered under an approach that is more permissive for creating private
rights of action.”297
The modern test then provides a general framework for evaluating new
causes of action. Congressional intent appears to be paramount, but courts will
only weigh the intent of Congress as it is explicitly filtered through “rightscreating language.” Underlying this rigid test are concerns about separation of
powers and the role of federal courts in defining rights and providing a specific
remedy.
b. The Flaws in Recognizing Implied Causes of Action Under the Alien
Tort Statute
The Alien Tort Statute cannot overcome the strict requirements imposed by
contemporary analysis of implied rights of action and the policy concerns
underlying those requirements. First, the text of the statute is plainly
jurisdictional, as the Supreme Court noted in Sosa, providing courts with no
indication of Congressional intent. Second, the international nature of Alien
Tort Statute litigation, and the role those cases play in important political
questions, makes the need for Congressional approval even stronger.
The text of the Alien Tort Statute is purely jurisdictional and makes no
attempt to grant any rights. The statute itself mentions rights of actions—a
“civil action by an alien for a tort only”—but the text does little more than
grant federal courts with the jurisdiction to hear those claims. The Supreme
Court recognized as much in Sosa, even noting that “we agree the statute is in
terms only jurisdictional . . . .”298 Of course, the Court then permitted causes of
action to spring forth from the statute based on a belief that “at the time of
enactment the jurisdiction enabled federal courts to hear claims” arising from a
narrow class of torts.299 The Court has consistently emphasized that, when the
text of a statute is unambiguous, that text becomes the alpha and the omega of

297

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 240, § 6.3.3, at 399.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004). In full, the Court said “[a]lthough we agree the
statute is in terms only jurisdictional, we think that at the time of enactment the jurisdiction enabled federal
courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized at common law.”
Id.
299 Id.
298
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statutory interpretation.300 The text does not provide a sufficiently clear
expression of intent to form an implied cause of action.
If, however, the Court were to appropriately reach the intent of the statute’s
drafters as a matter of statutory interpretation, their intent would not make an
expansive view of the statute any more certain. Regardless of whether the
framers intended for the statute to have some narrow effect upon its passage—
a matter that is itself hotly contested301—they did not anticipate the type of
expansive, forward-looking human rights litigation that is currently the
hallmark of the Alien Tort Statute.302 Ultimately though, the expectations of
the First Congress are irrelevant because the text of the statute is plainly
jurisdictional. The thirty-three-word statute fails to pass muster under the
heightened requirements for textual specificity that the Court alluded to in
Sandoval because it lacks clear rights-creating language.303
The politically sensitive nature of Alien Tort Statute litigation further
cautions against inferring rights of action from the opaque text of the statute.
Due to the nature of the Alien Tort Statute, litigation under the statute
frequently targets foreign leaders304 and other foreign government officials,305
leading to involvement from the political branches.306 Courts have recognized
300 See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Serv., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (“As we have
repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other
extrinsic material. Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a
reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.”).
301 See supra note 228. Compare Sosa, 542 U.S. at 718 (“There is no record of congressional discussion
about private actions that might be subject to the jurisdictional provision, or about any need for further
legislation to create private remedies; there is no record even of debate on the section.”), with Anne-Marie
Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 Am. J. Int’l L. 461, 488
(1989) (“[D]rafters could have envisioned its application in suits brought by aliens against U.S. citizens for
torts committed either within the United States or abroad, suits between aliens for a tort committed on U.S. soil
and suits between aliens for a tort committed on the high seas.” (citations omitted)).
302 See, e.g., Patti Waldmeir, An Abuse of Power, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2003, at 12 (“In the best traditions
of American legal creativity, US plaintiffs’ lawyers have revived a dormant 18th-century law and made it their
chief weapon in a 21st-century battle over corporate responsibility in an age of globalisation.”).
303 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001).
304 See, e.g., Tachiona v. Mugabe (Tachiona I), 169 F. Supp. 2d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), reconsideration
denied, Tachiona ex rel. Tachiona v. Mugabe (Tachiona II), 186 F. Supp. 2d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Tachiona v. United States (Tachiona III), 386 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004).
305 See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996).
306 The State Department and the Office of the Solicitor General are frequently asked to weigh in with
their views in Alien Tort Statute cases. See, e.g., 469 U.S. 811 (inviting the Solicitor General to file a brief
expressing the views of the United States in Tel-Oren). Those departments will also occasionally participate at
their own volition as an intervenor or as an amicus party. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae in Supporting Petitioners at 1, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (Dec. 21, 2011),
2011 WL 6425363 (“The United States has an interest in the proper application of the [Alien Tort Statute]
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the need for political intervention in many of these lawsuits and frequently call
for the views of the federal government by way of amicus briefs or even
appearances at oral argument.307
For instance, in Tachiona v. Mugabe, the Executive Branch intervened in
favor of foreign-leader defendants in an Alien Tort Statute case.308 In that case,
aliens brought suit under the Alien Tort Statute against Zimbabwean President
Robert Mugabe, his political party, and other party leaders, alleging acts of
torture and terrorism based on plaintiffs’ membership in an opposition political
party.309 The Department of State submitted a Suggestion of Immunity in
which it argued for immunity on behalf of all individual defendants and
Mugabe’s political party.310 The district court dismissed the suit against
Mugabe and the individual defendants but allowed the suit to proceed against
his political party under the Alien Tort Statute.311 Immediately prior to a failed
motion for reconsideration,312 the federal government intervened because the
outcome of the case had “some potential to implicate United States foreign
relations in a manner that the Government could legitimately seek to mitigate
by appeal.”313 In the court of appeals, the government was careful to outline
the geopolitical ramifications of the lower court decision, alleging that the
decision below “could give rise to the perception that the United States does
not honor [its] immunity and inviolability, and to resulting complaints or
retaliation.”314 That perception, the United States argued, could “deter [foreign
leaders] from engaging in diplomatic missions in the United States.”315 The
Alien Tort Statute’s serious implications for international relations clearly
because such actions can have implications for the Nation’s foreign and commercial relations and for the
enforcement of international law.”); Tachiona II, 186 F. Supp. 2d, at 397 (permitting the federal government to
intervene in support of a foreign leader, in part because “[a] decision affecting, as perceived by the
Government, the treatment of heads of state or foreign ministers visiting the United States, particularly under
the circumstances present here, may have some potential to implicate United States foreign relations in a
manner that the Government could legitimately seek to mitigate by appeal of this Court’s Decision”).
307 For example, the Second Circuit requested the views of the State Department in Filartiga, the D.C.
Circuit requested the views of the Solicitor General in Tel-Oren, and the Supreme Court requested the views of
the Solicitor General in both Tel-Oren and Sosa. Supra note 109 (noting that the Supreme Court called for the
views of the Solicitor General in Tel-Oren).
308 Tachiona III, 386 F.3d at 209.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 Tachiona I, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 316, 319.
312 Tachiona ex rel. Tachiona v. Mugabe (Tachiona II), 186 F. Supp. 2d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
313 Id. at 397.
314 Brief for Intervenor-Appellant-Cross-Appellee United States at 26, Tachiona III, 386 F.3d 205 (Nos.
03-6033 & 03-6043), 2003 WL 24174513.
315 Id. at 25.
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weigh in favor of requiring explicit Congressional approval for rights of
action.316
Alien Tort Statute litigation has taken an increasingly political tone and
litigants have also increasingly tried to circumvent the political process. There
is a growing belief among critics of the Alien Tort Statute that many cases are
deliberate attempts to slander corporations or to raise the profile of human
right causes.317 A commentator recently noted that regardless of the Supreme
Court’s decision in a pending case, litigants may continue to peruse dubious
claims under the Alien Tort Statute:
Even if the Court decides there is no corporate liability, Richard
Samp of the Washington Legal Foundation said, the number of Alien
Tort Statute suits may not decrease. “Suits will be brought against
individual officers,” he predicted. “The response to that is it would be
a lot harder to win those cases, but these lawsuits have never been
about winning but about getting a lot of bad publicity about
corporations and building sympathy for the cause plaintiffs are
318
involved in.”

Litigation brought under the existing model of the Alien Tort Statute can also
be used to circumvent the political branches. In order to show evidence of
customary international law, many claims improperly rely on non-binding
resolutions or treaties that the United States has not ratified.319 These cases
implicate the separation of powers because the judiciary is enforcing rights in a
United States court that are often deliberately not available to domestic
citizens.320

316 See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 865 (D. Md. 1961) (noting the foreign relations implications of
providing a private right of action, but concluding that the weightiness of the decision weights in favor of
realizing a cause of action); cf. Brandtscheit v. Britton, 239 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (breaking the
general rule that there is no federal diversity jurisdiction in a case between a German national and a resident of
California because “plaintiff is a citizen of a nation with which it is of the utmost importance that friendly
relations be maintained” in light of the Cold War); supra text accompanying notes 46–49 (noting the presence
of political forces in Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895)).
317 Marcia Coyle, Will Alien Tort Case Be Next Citizens United?, NAT’L L.J. SUP. CT. INSIDER (Feb. 1,
2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202540984798.
318 Id.; accord Jean-Marie Simon, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Justice or Show Trials?, 11 B.U. INT’L L.J.
1 (1993). Taken as a whole, Alien Tort Statute litigation may also have a bias towards liberal political regimes.
Id. at 78 (“[W]hile human rights organizations have brought at least seven [Alien Tort Statute] lawsuits in the
past five years alone, not a single one implicated an official of any leftist government.”).
319 Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law and Private Rights of Action, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 421,
428 (2000); see also infra Part II.C.2.
320 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 748–49 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the
Second Circuit in Kadic v. Karadz̆ ić, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), relied on the Genocide Convention, which
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The presumption against implied causes of action plays an important role in
separating the legislative and judicial branches. The presumption ensures both
that Congress does not escape accountability for important policy questions
and that the judicial branch does not expand its own power by creating a
multitude of rights that are enforceable in court. The Alien Tort Statute does
not meet the high bar set by the Supreme Court for implied causes of action,
and the highly politicized nature of litigation under the statute further cautions
against recognition of causes of action. The Supreme Court provided only a
cursory discussion of this topic in Sosa, leaving lower courts to independently
fold the Alien Tort Statute framework into the existing legal landscape.
3. An Atheoretical Framework
Atheoretical decision-making occurs when judges render “fact-based
holdings . . . without any explanatory theory” or provide “only the narrowest
theoretical grounds for the result reached.”321 There may be benefits to
minimalist judicial decision-making,322 but those benefits are non-existent in
the context of the Alien Tort Statute, where a sophisticated understanding of
the theoretical framework of the statute is necessary for the proper—and
consistent—evolution of the statute.323 The harms of an atheoretical framework
are exacerbated by the Court’s failure to place the statute within the existing
landscape on the development of federal common law and on the recognition
of implied causes of action.

Congress has explicitly said shall not “be construed as creating any substantive or procedural right enforceable
by law by any party in any proceeding” (citing the Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18
U.S.C. § 1092)).
321 Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and Its
Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1413 (2002). For defenses of this approach, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE
AT A TIME 9 (1999); Richard A. Posner, Conceptions of Legal “Theory”: A Response to Ronald Dworkin, 29
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 377 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, From Theory to Practice, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 389 (1997)
[hereinafter Sunstein, From Theory to Practice]; Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided]. For a criticism of the atheoretical,
minimalist position, see Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353 (1997). For a critique of
atheoretical decision-making in a specific field of law—election law—see Gerken, supra.
322 SUNSTEIN, supra note 321, at 24–54. Sunstein largely divides his arguments in favor of minimalism
into two groups: one emphasizes the “democracy-promoting” value of minimalism, id. at 24–45, and the other
emphasizes the low decision costs, id. at 46–54.
323 Cf. id. at 57–60 (discussing when minimalism is especially favorable to “maximalism” and when the
opposite may be true).
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a. The Debate over “Theory”
The debate over the use of theory in judicial decision-making has divided
scholars and judges into two main camps: those that support the theoryembedded324 view and those that support the atheoretical view.325 The theoryembedded view sees judicial rulemaking as an opportunity to distill broad
principles of legal theory into easily digestible rules of decision.326 For
proponents of the theory-embedded view, every case is an opportunity to refine
broad principles of law and to thread those principles through the corpus juris.
These principles are not only a useful way to tie bodies of law together, but, as
proponents of the fully-theorized position argue, theorizing rules is an
inevitable part of folding individual cases into a body of law.327 As Ronald
Dworkin, a leading proponent of the theory-embedded view, phrased it:
“[L]aw is theory drenched, and . . . reflective lawyers understand that even
though they do not agree on what theory it is drenched in.”328 The theoryembedded camp has been criticized as an impractical intrusion on overworked
judges329 and an unworkable model given the divergence of viewpoints on
important first principles.330
The minimalist position331—which is further divided into the truly antitheoretical camp and the minimally theorized camp332—believes that judges
should be “directing their attention to the immediate practical problem posed
by any political occasion.”333 Atheoretical rules can be crafted in a number of

324

See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 321, at 354.
See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 321, at 1427.
326 See Dworkin, supra note 321, at 354.
327 See id. at 371.
328 Id. at 360.
329 Sunstein, From Theory to Practice, supra note 321, at 391 (“Judges ordinarily work with principles of
a low level of theoretical ambition. Conceptual ascents are relatively rare in law. Like all of us, judges have
limited time and capacities, and like almost all of us, judges are not trained philosophers.”).
330 Id. at 392 (Minimalism “is particularly important for law within a highly pluralistic culture. It is
important because it is a way of promoting stability, reducing strains on time and capacities, and
demonstrating mutual respect; it is not very respectful to take on other people’s most fundamental
commitments when it is not necessary to do so.”).
331 Gerken, supra note 321, at 1433. Dworkin refers to this position as the “practical,” but still other
scholars describe this as the “pragmatic” position. Compare Dworkin, supra note 321, at 354 (using the term
“practical”), with Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove, Book Review, Can Pragmatism Be Radical? Richard
Posner and Legal Pragmatism, 113 YALE L.J. 687 (2003) (using the term “pragmatic”).
332 Gerken, supra note 321, at 1433. Gerken labels the groups in a different way, calling the general
position the “minimalist” approach and its two variants the “atheoretical” approach and the “minimal
theorizing” approach. Id.
333 Dworkin, supra note 321, at 354.
325
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ways, some more likely to produce more stable results than others. For
instance, minimalist decisions can be narrowly crafted to leave the door open
for more coherent theoretical positions in the future.334 Minimalist decisions
can also be shallow, meaning that they develop a new theory on top of existing
theory only as much as is necessary to reach a holding, rather than rooting a
new theory in fundamental principles of law.335 Sunstein, in his influential
book on minimalist decision-making, notes that the minimalist approach is
most appropriate “when the Court is dealing with a constitutional issue of high
complexity about which many people feel deeply and on which the nation is in
flux (on moral or other grounds).”336
Atheoretical decision-making can occur in almost any field of law. An
illustrative example is Baker v. Carr, the landmark election law case that first
established the principle of one person, one vote.337 In the 1962 case, the
Supreme Court leaned on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to bar wildly disproportional congressional districts within
Tennessee.338 The lopsidedness of the facts339 tremendously affected the
Court’s ruling because the Court could have constructed almost any test—
using almost any language—and arrived at the same judgment. The Court
adopted equality as its overriding theory, but the Court almost deliberately did
not contextualize its new test within the greater discussion on equality.340 On a
theoretical level,341 courts were left to guess whether one person, one vote
implemented the somewhat vague principle of equality by way of “the
antidiscrimination principle,” “subordination theory,” or any one of the
“intermediary theories” that could tie the Court’s new test to a more abstract
principle.342 Following Baker, courts struggled to apply the one person, one

334

SUNSTEIN supra note 321, at 10–11.
See id. at 11–14.
336 Id. at 8.
337 369 U.S. 186, 207–08 (1962).
338 Id. at 209–10.
339 That state had been using legislative districts that were drawn in 1901, when the urban population was
much lower than it was when Baker reached the Supreme Court. The disproportionality of the districts was
striking; thirty-seven percent of Tennessee citizens lived in districts that elected sixty-one percent of state
Senators and forty percent of citizens elected sixty-one percent of the state House of Representatives. Id. at
253 (Clark, J., concurring).
340 Gerken, supra note 321, at 1413–14.
341 On a practical level, it was equally unclear whether equality meant an equal population, an equal
voting-age population, an equal number of actual voters, or an equal share of political power. Id.
342 Id.; see also id. at 1421–27 (listing possible intermediary theories that the Supreme Court either
dismissed or ignored).
335

BHATIA GALLEYSPROOFS2

498

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

vote framework to cases with facts more complex than those in Baker itself.343
The Court’s rocky foray into atheoretical decision-making in Baker bears a
striking similarity to the Court’s controversial decision in Sosa.
While atheoretical decision-making can be a useful mechanism for
deciding individual cases without creating the kind of unintended
consequences that accompany abrupt shifts in legal theory,344 it also passes
along a burden to future courts that may grapple with the same question345—as
it did in Baker. An incomplete or incoherent judicial framework for developing
cases forces future courts to analyze developing questions without the benefit
of useful overriding principles.346 When the Supreme Court decides a case
without developing a framework that can guide lower courts or even future
Supreme Court decisions, it only puts off an inevitable question of theory that
it will be forced to address at some point in the future.347
b. The Sosa Framework as an Example of Atheoretical Decision-making
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa is a model for atheoretical decisionmaking and stands to cause many of the same problems that atheoretical
decision-making has caused in the past.348 The arrangement that the Supreme
Court forged in Sosa was meant to be a convenient, practical combination of
the conflicting interpretations that had developed, but the Court failed to
properly contextualize the new causes of action it created. Without a proper
theory to explain how the statute fit into the surrounding legal landscape,
courts were left to inconsistently and haphazardly apply the decision’s
mandate. A look at the Court’s reasoning in Sosa and the existing legal
landscape provide further explanation.
The Court initially acknowledged that the statute was purely jurisdictional
but then backed off of that view when it became apparent that a purely
jurisdictional model would have been “stillborn” without Congressional action
343 See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983). In Karcher, the Supreme Court stuck down a
redistricting plan in which “the population of the largest district is less than one percent greater than the
population of the smallest district.” Id. at 727. Karcher has been heavily criticized for describing “the injury in
circular terms, substitut[ing] general paeans to individualism for concrete doctrinal analysis, and defin[ing]
equality in a rigid, mechanical way.” Gerken, supra note 321, at 1415.
344 SUNSTEIN, supra note 321. See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Deciding When To Decide: How
Appellate Procedure Distributes the Costs of Legal Change, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (2011).
345 See Gerken, supra note 321, at 1427–43.
346 Id.
347 See Dworkin, supra note 321, at 371.
348 See Gerken, supra note 321, at 1427–43.
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beyond the Alien Tort Statute.349 Finding that position unsavory, the Court was
forced then to give the statute some degree of force.350 It quickly found the
initial customary international law violations in Blackstone’s works.351
Other courts considering the Alien Tort Statute have reached decisions
similar to Sosa while also providing more theoretical guidance for their
position.352 In Filartiga, for example, the Second Circuit interpreted the Alien
Tort Statute as flatly jurisdictional353 and created a sphere of federal common
law that was filed by the law of nations.354 The panel “construe[d] the Alien
Tort Statute, not as granting new rights to aliens, but simply as opening the
federal courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized by international
law.”355 Moving forward, courts were given a simple theoretical underpinning
with which to develop law in the area: If behavior violated customary
international law, plaintiffs were permitted to invoke Alien Tort Statute
jurisdiction to plead their claim.356
However, in Sosa, the Court’s holding that the Alien Tort Statute allows a
narrow class of claims was a prudential holding that solved the dispute in Sosa
but set up a wealth of problems that have plagued lower courts since then.
Tempering the literal wording of the statute with practical considerations is a
problem primarily because courts lack any guiding theory to balance the two
forces. For example, courts and academics have run in circles arguing even the
threshold question of whether Sosa takes a modernist or revisionist point of
view on the Alien Tort Statute, a necessary question when determining
whether an international law norm can be brought as a cause of action.
C. Practical Flaws in the Sosa Framework
The cracks in the theoretical foundation of the hybrid model might be more
easily overlooked if they were not also producing serious problems for lower
courts looking to that model for guidance. Chief among those problems is one

349 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004) (“Sosa would have it that the [Alien Tort Statute]
was stillborn because there could be no claim for relief without a further statute expressly authorizing adoption
of causes of action.”).
350 Id.
351 Id. at 714–15.
352 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
353 Id. at 890.
354 Id.
355 Id. at 887; see also Bradley, supra note 35, at 592.
356 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 887.
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specific to the Alien Tort Statute—the difficulty of creating consistent rules of
decision for law of nations claims—and one general to federal courts—the lack
of information and lack of expertise with international law.
1. Difficulty Operating within the Sosa Framework
Confusion in the lower courts may be a result of the Supreme Court failing
to properly define its own test357 or it may be the result of Court’s failure to
adopt a test dynamic enough to meet modern needs.358 The Sosa standard has
been criticized for not covering human rights offenses that fail to meet the high
standard of international torts such as piracy and safe-conduct.359 At the time
the Alien Tort Statute was created, torts such as piracy may have been
condemned as widely as genocide and war crimes are today.360 However, a key
distinction between the two classes of customary international law is that the
modern “torts” lack a uniform definition between and among nations.361 Put
another way, universal condemnation of appalling crimes means little for the
purposes of the Alien Tort Statute because countries differ so widely on their
definition of those crimes.362 The absence of any modern torts does not doom
the Sosa standard on its face because the framework could simply be
interpreted to permit claims arising under Blackstone’s original common law
torts and modern torts when they eventually reach the same level. However,
the Supreme Court explicitly equated several modern torts with
Blackstone’s,363 leaving courts to wonder whether modern torts must actually
rise to the level of the original triplet.364
357 Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Tells Us About the Limits
of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 113 (2004) (noting the possibility of “conflicting
decisions due to the Court’s scant description of the test it envisions”).
358 Id. at 156–57 (“[P]iracy had a narrow and precise definition. In contrast, the definitions of the human
rights offenses nominated for [universal jurisdiction] are broad and indeterminate, as even supporters of an
expanded [universal jurisdiction] concede. This raises the possibility that the availability of [universal
jurisdiction] over such conduct would hinge on the political or moral inclinations of the prosecutors and
judges; the vagueness of these offenses would at a minimum give judges great discretion in matters pertaining
to foreign relations, a discretion traditionally reserved to the political branches.”).
359 See id.
360 See id. at 156.
361 Id.
362 Id. Kontorovich goes on to caution “the vagueness of these offenses would at a minimum give judges
great discretion in matters pertaining to foreign relations, a discretion traditionally reserved to the political
branches.” Id. at 157.
363 Compare Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (“Whatever the ultimate criteria for
accepting a cause of action subject to jurisdiction under § 1350, we are persuaded that federal courts should
not recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350
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The Court in Sosa recognized that its stiff legal framework—consisting of
heightened analysis of customary international law—would not, and could not,
list all of the factors necessary for courts to consider when drafting new causes
of action.365 In fact, the majority opinion gave only passing mention to one of
the most important factors: the entirely political question of whether certain
activity can be adjudicated in United States courts. When the Court mentioned
that future courts “should (and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an element of
judgment about the practical consequences of making that cause available to
litigants,” it unwittingly opened the door for future courts to consider a myriad
of purely political factors.366
2. General Difficulty with International Law
Whether in the context of the Alien Tort Statute or not, federal courts have
struggled with the ground-level process of analyzing customary international
law. Their troubles are hardly a recent phenomenon; federal courts have long
been notoriously poor at divining the true direction of customary international
law.367 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example, has been
heavily criticized for its handling of customary international law in Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Corp.368 The Court of Appeals’ conclusion has been
controversial, but the criticism aimed at the court’s methodology raises a red
was enacted.”), with id. at 762 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Today international law will sometimes similarly
reflect not only substantive agreement as to certain universally condemned behavior but also procedural
agreement that universal jurisdiction exists to prosecute a subset of that behavior. That subset includes torture,
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.” (citations omitted)).
364 Courts have informally split on whether to adopt torts that do not rise to the level of infamy achieved
by war crimes and the most heinous human rights violations. While no circuits have explicitly declined to
adopt lesser torts, some have been more willing to do so than others. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has
allowed a claim for ownership of stolen artwork and the Second Circuit has allowed a claim to proceed for
simply doing business with South Africa’s apartheid regime. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 580 F.3d 1048,
1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (ownership of stolen artwork); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d
Cir. 2007) (conducting business with South Africa’s apartheid regime).
365 Kontorovich, supra note 357, at 156–57.
366 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732–33.
367 See Michelle M. Kundmueller, Note, The Application of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts:
Custom, Convention, or Pseudo-Legislation?, 28 J. LEGIS. 359, 372–77 (identifying several instances where
U.S. courts mistook international agreements and conventions for evidence of state practice, the building block
of international custom); see also Emily Kadens & Ernest A. Young, How Customary Is Customary
International Law?, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 885, 914 (2013) (“[A] set of difficulties arises . . . from the
striking differences between the settings in which customary law traditionally arose and the issues on which it
spoke, on the one hand, and the contemporary settings in which advocates of customary international law seek
to employ customary norms, on the other.”).
368 See Brief of Amici Curiae International Law Scholars in Support of Petitioner, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (Dec. 21, 2011), 2011 WL 6780141.
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flag about the appropriateness of tasking federal judges, at the trial or appellate
level, with divining the intricacies of customary international law.369 A recent
decision of the Second Circuit370 was criticized for incorrectly relying on the
text of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to codify
customary international law when the statute, by its own terms, does not seek
to codify custom.371 Even Filartiga, the landmark human rights case, featured
the dubious use of unconventional sources to glean the consensus of customary
international law. That case cited, among other sources, two U.N. General
Assembly resolutions, non-binding resolutions and treaties, and a survey of
national constitutions.372 Those sources are generally not accepted as valid
tools for weighing the view of customary international law373 and their use
creates, at a minimum, a potential for inconsistency among federal courts.
Difficulty with international sources is also attributable to contemporary
trends that make gauging international law more difficult than ever. For
example, private actors now define international norms more than ever
before,374 making it difficult for courts to apply well-worn techniques to
modern circumstances.375 Adopting a new set of tools for interpreting
international law may not be the solution; scholars have noted that
international law is fragmenting into a diverse array of subject-matter regimes,
each of which is governed by its own set of custom and guiding sources of
law.376

369

Id.
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, Ltd., 504 U.S. 254 (2007), aff’d sub nom. due to lack of quorum,
Am. Izuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008).
371 Kevin Jon Heller, The Alien Tort Statute and International Law, OPINIOJURIS (Sept. 26, 2008, 8:58
PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2008/09/26/the-alien-tort-statute-and-international-law-guest-post; see Chimène I.
Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 88 (2008) (“Although the
Rome Statute, along with its interpretation and its application by the ICC, will constitute important evidence of
state practice and opinio juris for the purpose of identifying customary international law norms, they are not
dispositive and do not override the cumulative weight of other evidentiary sources.”); see also Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court art. 10, done July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (“Nothing in this Part shall be
interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes
other than this Statute.”).
372 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882–84 (2d Cir. 1980).
373 DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 44 (3d ed. 2010); see also Bradley,
Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 215, at 901 (criticizing the sources used in Filartiga).
374 Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1593–617 (2011).
375 Id. at 1655–69.
376 See Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International Law, Part II: Our Fragmenting Legal Community, 44
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1049 (2012); see also Harlan G. Cohen, From International Law to International
Conflicts of Law: The Fragmentation of Legitimacy, 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 49 (2010).
370
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Although difficulty interpreting international law is not unique to purposes
of the Alien Tort Statute,377 the statute presents its own unique complexities:
[Courts that decide Alien Tort Statute claims] (constantly citing each
other) have gradually built up a hybrid jurisprudence of certain
aspects of international criminal law—war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide, for example—together with other materials
drawn from US civil and tort law, such as corporate liability, aiding
and abetting, and similar doctrines. The individual terms of the onesentence Alien Tort Statute . . . create idiosyncratic pressures on
378
interpretation.

Among those idiosyncrasies is the Supreme Court’s unique reconceptualization
of the law of nations. Not content to look at either traditional sources of
international custom379 or even the narrow class of jus cogens,380 the Supreme
Court required United States courts to craft a unique, intermediary tier of
accepted custom.381 The Supreme Court had the opportunity to latch onto
either pre-existing class of international custom, but the new standard breaks
from both reasonably well-defined classes. International law scholars and
foreign jurists frequently discuss trends in international practice that bring new
activity into the realm of customary international law or jus cogens,382 but few
have reason to discuss whether those customs meet the specific Sosa
requirements.383 United States courts have frequently relied upon academics
and other expert sources to survey the international law landscape, and the
377 As a general matter, “there is significant uncertainty today surrounding both the method of customary
international law formation and its content. Consequently, there is substantial room for creativity by lawyers
and judges.” Bradley, supra note 102, at 472.
378 Anderson, supra note 212, at 350. Anderson also criticizes the uniqueness of the test crafted by the
Supreme Court in Sosa:

Whatever exactly the law of nations means as an international law term, it means something
different in the hands of American courts which, under Sosa, are required to look not strictly to
‘traditional’ international sources, such as those stated in the ICJ statute, nor strictly to such
concepts as jus cogens—but instead, per Sosa, to a somewhat altered form of original meaning
jurisprudence and what the drafters of the statute meant, along with some ‘fundamental’ matters
of the law of nations.
Id.
379

Id.
Id. Jus cogens, sometimes referred to as ius cogens, are those international customs that are so wellestablished in international practice that states may not opt out of them under any circumstances. BEDERMAN,
supra note 373, at 25.
381 Supra Part II.A.
382 See, e.g., Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 91, 94 (discussing whether certain
crimes had reached the level of jus cogens).
383 Cf., e.g., id.
380
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creation of the new Sosa standard deprives domestic courts of much-needed
third-party guidance—especially because it does not seem likely to be adopted
in other contexts.384
Whether the fault lies with the statute itself, the subject-matter,385 or with
the actors interpreting it, courts are struggling with the sophisticated analysis
required to discern the intricacies of customary international law.386 In light of
the Sosa framework’s theoretical and practical problems, courts have been
forced into the unenviable position of crafting causes of action—and all of the
peripheral law that goes along with them—from a rigid, short-sighted
definition. Without any meaningful theoretical support, courts have been
remarkably inconsistent in their holdings on fundamental topics.
III. THE PURELY JURISDICTIONAL VIEW TAKES ON CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS
The purely jurisdictional view of the Alien Tort Statute would provide a
more satisfying framework for addressing at least two major contemporary
problems that exist in the hybrid framework. The first is that the statute would
conform to other parts of the law and provide a more logically coherent
framework. Second, a purely jurisdictional view would help courts accurately
and consistently apply customary international law.
Several structural flaws in the Alien Tort Statute were on display during
different stages of litigation in Kiobel.387 In that case, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that corporations could not be held liable under the
Alien Tort Statute,388 creating a circuit split on the question of corporate

384

The Supreme Court’s heightened customary international law requirements certainly could be used in
the context of other federal programs, but the Supreme Court seemed to tie the heightened requirements to the
unique legislative history and historical context of the Alien Tort Statute. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 725–727 (2004). The Court’s discussion of miscellaneous factors effecting the adoption of new
causes of action, see supra text accompanying notes 156–162, makes it even less likely that the Alien Tort
Statute’s standard will be useful in any other contexts.
385 Cf. Harlan Cohen, Towards a Pluralism of International Law(s)?, OPINIOJURIS (Dec. 14, 2011, 10:19
AM), http://opiniojuris.org/towards-a-pluralism-of-international-laws (describing “the continued need to break
free of the international law paradigm and develop a more pluralistic understanding of regulation across
borders”).
386 Anderson, supra note 212, at 350.
387 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (mem.) (2011).
388 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, No.
10-1491 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2013).
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liability under the statute.389 The Second Circuit panel found that “imposing
liability on corporations for violations of customary international law has not
attained a discernible, much less universal, acceptance among nations.”390 The
court primarily relied on the sources of international law detailed in Article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,391 including published
opinions of international courts, international treaties, and the works of
renowned publicists.392
The Second Circuit’s decision was heavily criticized, both for its
substantive outcome and for its methodology. Substantively, the decision was
criticized for ignoring general principles of law393 and for ignoring other
important sources of international custom.394 Methodological questions about
the decision cut to the heart of the court’s analysis, asking whether the decision
“conflate[s] the jurisdictional and cause of action aspects [of the statute].”395
The debate was no longer only about whether the law of nations permitted
corporate liability, but whether United States courts should even look abroad
for the answer.396 In the Supreme Court, much of the debate has centered on
that question rather than on the substantive questions of customary
international law that have been at the forefront of other cases brought under
the Alien Tort Statute.397 The Court sidestepped the question of corporate
liability in Kiobel, leaving it open for resolution in later cases.398
Confusion over corporate liability is that much more alarming when
contrasted with the Court’s straightforward experience interpreting with the
Torture Victim Protection Act. In fact, the Supreme Court heard oral argument
in a case centered around the Torture Victim Protection Act on the same day it

389

Supra note 183 (listing cases on both sides of the split).
Id. at 145.
391 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055 [hereinafter ICJ
Statute].
392 Kiobel, 621 F.3d, at 132–46. Within the meaning of Article 38, “publicists” are renowned scholars and
jurists. Id. at 132 (quoting ICJ Statute, supra note 391, art. 38).
393 See, e.g., Tyler Banks, Comment, Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: The Second
Circuit’s Misstep Around General Principles of Law in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 26 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 227 (2012).
394 Brief Amici Curiae International Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners at 17–34, Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S. Dec. 21, 2013), 2011 WL 6780141.
395 Odette Murray et al., Exaggerated Rumours of the Death of an Alien Tort? Corporations, Human
Rights and the Remarkable Case of Kiobel, 12 MELB. J. INT’L L. 57, 1, June 2011, at 75 (2011).
396 Id.
397 Brief for Petitioners, Kiobel, No. 10-1491 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2011), 2011 WL 6396550.
398 Kiobel, No. 10-1491, slip op. at 4.
390
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first heard arguments in Kiobel, but the tone of the litigation in the two cases
could not have been more different. While the corporate liability case quickly
morphed into a tremendously complex jurisprudential behemoth,399 the Torture
Victim Protection Act case instantly “seem[ed] very likely to be an easy one
for the Court.”400 The Court was tasked with deciding two cases stemming
from the Alien Tort Statute: one involving complex analysis of international
norms and the other implicating fairly conventional questions of statutory
interpretation.
If the Court were to hold that the statute was purely jurisdictional, it would
then be up to Congress to formulate a cause of action. Because of the
resources, time, and experts available to Congress, that body is better suited to
make the difficult, complicated decisions that must be made when new rights
are recognized.401 Congress’ relatively straightforward experience with the
Torture Victim Protection Act,402 and courts’ unremarkable experience
merging it into practice,403 are a model for how the Alien Tort Statute can be
both manageable and incredibly powerful.404
CONCLUSION
The Alien Tort Statute’s long dormancy and swift reanimation have caused
fissures in the framework of the statute that are unlikely to resolve themselves
in the near future. The initial round of briefs in Kiobel and the recent Torture
Victim Protection Act case are archetypal examples of the confusion that has
been caused by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sosa. The jurisdictional view,
399 See Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: Human Rights Abuses and the Law, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 25,
2012, 12:09 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/02/argument-preview-human-rights-abuses-and-the-law
(“Both sides in the case have labored strenuously to read into Sosa very clear support for what each believes an
[Alien Tort Statute] complaint must embrace, and their perceptions clearly conflict, but the mere fact that both
can do so without making frivolous arguments suggests that Sosa is anything but a clear guidepost.”).
400 Id.
401 Cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004) (“And although we have even assumed
competence to make judicial rules of decision of particular importance to foreign relations, such as the act of
state doctrine . . . the general practice has been to look for legislative guidance before exercising innovative
authority over substantive law.”); id. at 731 (welcoming congressional intervention in crafting causes of
action).
402 Mariani, supra note 137, at 1392–93.
403 Id. at 1399.
404 Id. at 1385 (“The TVPA, [compared to the Alien Tort Statute,] is a more recent and detailed expression
of legislative will, and provides significantly more guidance to those seeking to interpret and apply it. The
TVPA creates an explicit cause of action for a narrow set of conduct, precisely defines that conduct, and
details the manner in which that cause of action must be pursued. In short, it lacks the fundamental ambiguity
that characterizes the [Alien Tort Statute].”).
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however, could mend many of these problems by leaving Congress to make
many of the decisions that currently plague the federal courts. In Sosa, the
Supreme Court was hesitant to abruptly halt the bulk of Alien Tort Statute
litigation. Its hesitancy, however, lead it to a pragmatic result that preserved
the modern status quo at the expense of future development.405
Inconsistencies—both within the Sosa opinion and between that opinion
and the greater opus of federal law—have tasked courts with crafting law that
ought to be carefully drafted by Congress. Those courts are also thrust into
resolving political debates that they are not suited to handle and into
incorporating practical concerns that are best left to Congress. An
interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute that pushes the statute into Congress’
domain would cleanly resolve many of the most difficult problems currently
plaguing the Alien Tort Statute. Recent debates over corporate liability and
aiding and abetting liability may simply foreshadow deeper concerns over the
Alien Tort Statute.
In Sosa’s wake, Julian Ku predicted a new wave of Alien Tort Statute
litigation: claims targeting the United States government for its own human
rights abuses abroad.406 Regardless of the cause of that movement, courts are
not well-equipped to handle the added challenges brought by this new layer of
complexity.407 Not only does this new wave require courts to maneuver more
sophisticated corners of customary international law,408 but it also requires
courts to engage directly with a political branch enforcing its dominion over
foreign policy—in foreign territory. Without a sturdier theoretical foundation
than the current one, courts will continue to struggle with Alien Tort Statute
litigation.
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405

See supra Part I.E (describing the state of litigation prior to Sosa).
Julian G. Ku, The Third Wave: The Alien Tort Statute and the War on Terrorism, 19 EMORY INT’L L.
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407 Id. at 124–26 (outlining the possible conflicts between judicial and executive interpretation of
customary international law).
408 Federal courts have heretofore dabbled in the customary international law view of egregious human
rights violations, but the latest wave of litigation asks them to address more subtle questions related to the
liability of a sovereign in its own domestic courts. See Bederman, supra note 102, at 258.
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